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MAY  1960 



J.  Edgar  Hoover,  Director 










Printed  for  the  use  of  the  Committee  on  the  Judiciary 

57425  0  WASHINGTON  :    1960 

B,  Coplon  -   Gubitchev  Case  27 

C,  Fuchs  -   Gold  -  Rosenberg 

Atomic  Espionage  Conspiracy  27 

1.     Harry  Gold  27 

2»     David  Greenglass  29 

J,      Julius  and  Ethel  Rosenberg  JO 

4.  Morton  Jobell  3^ 

5,  William  Perl  32 

6.  Alfred  Dean  Slack  32 

7,  Abraham  Brothman  33 

8,  Miriam  Moskowitz  33 

9.  Anatoli   Yakovlev  3^ 
10,      Semen  Markovich  Semenov  J4 

D,  Clarence  Howard   Vetterli   Case  35 

E,  Otto   Verber  -  Kurt  Ponger  Case  J6 

F»      Jack  Soble  Case  37 

1,      Jack  and  Myra  Soble  37 

2»      Jacob  Albam  39 

J.      Jane  and  George  Zlatovski  39 

4.  Alfred  and  Martha  Stern  40 

5.  Ilya   Wolston  40 

6,  Mark  Zborowski  41 

7,  Vassili  Molev  42 
3,     Mikhail  Nikolaevich  Svirin  42 

G,      Colonel  Rudolf  Ivanovich  Abel  Case  4J 

1.  Reino  Hayhanen  4J 

2,  Colonel  Rudolf  Ivanovich  Abel  4J 
J.     Roy  Adair  Rhodes  44 


JANUARY  1,    19^0,    THROUGH  MAY  1,    19^  46 

A,      Yuri   Vasilyevich  Novikov  46 

3,      Igor  Aleksandrovich  Amosov  47 

C,  Aleksandr  Petrovich  Kovalev  48 

D,  Leonid  Tgorovich  Pivnev  49 

E,  Maksim  Grigorievich  Martynov  $0 

F,  Aleksandr  Konstantinovich  Guryanov  $0 

G,  Ivan  Aleksandrovich  Bubchikov  5^ 

H.  Boris  Fedorovich  Gladkov  5^ 

I,  Rostislav  E,    Shapovalov  52 

J,  Viktor  Ivanovich  Petrov  52 

K,  Konstantin  Pavlovich  Ekimov  53 

L,  Yuri  Pavlovich  Krylov  53 

M,  Vassili  Mikhailovich  Molev  5* 

N,  Vladimir  Arsenevich  Grusha  54 

0,  Gennadi  Fedorovich  Mashkantsev  55 

P,  Nikolai   Ivanovich  Kurochkin  5^ 

Q»  Kirill  Sergeevich  Doronkin  5^ 

R,  E'vgeni  Alekseevich  Zaostrovtsev  57 

S,  Vadim  Aleksandrovich  Kirilyuk  5^ 



A,  Dr,   Alan  Nunn  May  59 

3.  Sam  Carr  69 

0,  Ignacy  Samuel  Witczak  60 

D,  Emil  Julius  Klaus  Fuchs  62 

E,  PontecorvOf   Burgess  and  Maclean  62 



Recent  Soviet  propaganda   ?ia8  denounced   the  United 
States  for  aerial    reconnaissance  of  the  Soviet  Union   in  terms 
designed  to  convince  the  world   that   the  USSR  would  not   stoop 
to   espionage.      In  discussing   this  subject  and  the  reception 
which  President  Ei senhower  might   expect  on  his  visit   to 
Russia,   Premier  Khrushchev  was  quoted   in  the  newspapers  on 
May  11,    i960,    as  wondering  what   would  have  been  the  reaction  of 
the  American  people    if  the  Russians  had  sent  a  plane  over   the 
United  States  on  the  eve  of  his  visit   to   this  country. 

The  facts  are  that  at   the  very  time  Premier  Khrushchev 
was  advancing   to   the  podium  to    speak  before  the  United  Nations 
General  Assembly  on  September  Id,    1959>    two  Soviet   espionage 
agents  were  cautiously  surveying  a   street  corner   in  Springfield, 
Massachusetts,    in  preparation  for  a  clandestine  meeting  with  an 
American  whom  they  were  attempting   to   subvert.     At   the  very 
time  that  Khrushchev  was  declaring   that  a  means  must   be  found 
to   stop  mankind  from  backsliding   into  an  abyss  of  war,    Vadim  A, 
Kirilyuk,    Soviet  employee  of  the  United  Nations,    was  attempting 
to    induce  this  American  to  furnish  information  regarding  United 
States  cryptographic  machines  and  to   secure  employment    in  a 
vital   United  States  Government  agency  where  he  could  obtain 
classified   information  for  the  Russians,      While   this  meeting 
was  taking  place  Kirilyuk  and  the  American  were  under  observation 
by  Leonid  A,  Kovalev,   another  Soviet   employee  of  the  United 
Nations  who   was  conducting  a  counter  surveillance.      Unknown  to 
the  Russians,    however,    this  meeting  was  also   being  observed  by 
Special  Agents  of  the  FBI  who   obtained  photographs  of  the  Russians, 

Not  only  did   these  RusMians  stoop  to   spying,    but   they 
callously  abused   their  status  as  guests  of  this  country  to   spy 
in  the  most   reprehensible  manner  —   the  subversion  of  an  American 
on  American  soil. 

1    - 

Although  FBI  Agents  observed  this  meeting  and  photo- 
graphed  the  Russians,    no  publicity  uas  given  to   this  incident 
in  view  of  the  negotiations  which  were   then   in  progress.     This 
incident,   as  contrasted  with  the   recent   handling  of  the  plane 
incident   by  the  Russians,   gives  ample   testimony  as  to   which 
country   is  acting    in  good  faith   in  trying   to   maintain  world  peace. 

And   this   is  not  an   isolated   incident   -  nor  has  the 
target  alxmys  been  so  limited.      The  facts  are  that  Soviet  agents 
for   three  decades  have  engaged   in  extensive  espionage  against 
this  country,   and   through  the  years  have  procured  a   volume  of 
information  which  would  stagger   the   imagination.      This   infor- 
mation  includes  literally  dozens  of  aerial   photographs  of  major 
U.   So   cities  and  vital  areas  which  have  given  the  Russians  the 
product  of  aerial    reconnaissance  Just  as  surely  as   if  Soviet 
planes  had  been  sent  over  this  country. 


In  a  free  country  such  things  as  aerial   photographs 
are  available   to   the  public  and  can  be  purchased  commercially. 
The  Sovietehave  been  fully  aware  of  this  and   throughout   the 
years  have  taken  full   advantage  of  this  free   information, 
collecting  aerial  photographs  of  many  areas  of  the  United  States. 

For  example,   during  October,    1953>    "t^wo   Soviet  officials 
visited  Minneapolis  where   they  purchased  fifteen  aerial 
photographs  of  Minneapolis  and  St.   Paul.      In  October  and  November, 
1953>    'two   Soviets  traveled   in  Missouri   and  Texas  and  obtained 
aerial   maps  of  Dallas,   Tulsa,   Fort   Worth  and   the   surrounding 
areas  covering  a  Naval   air  station,   an  Army  airfield,    and  an 
Air  Force  base.      In  April,   195^>   a  Soviet  official  purchased 
aerial   photographs  of  five  Long  Island  communities.     Also,    in 
April,   19S-^f   a  Soviet  official  purchased  three  aerial  photographs 
of  Boston,   Massachusetts,   and  Newport,   Rhode  Island,   areas.      In 
^yt   195^t    three  Soviets  traveled   to  California   where   they 
ordered  from  a  Los  Angeles  photography  shop  $dO  worth  of  aerial 
photographs  covering   the  Los  Angeles  area. 

However,    they  have  not   been  content   with  acquisition 
of  publicly  available  data.     For  example,    on  May  J,   195'^t 
Leonid  E.  Pivnev,   an  assistant   Soviet  air  attache  stationed   in 
Washington,    who   had  previously   traveled  extensively   throughout 
the  United  States  and  had  obtained  commercially  available  aerial 
photographs  of  various  areas  of  this  country,    requested  a 

Washington,   Dc    Co,   photographer  to   rent  an  airplane  to   take 
photographs  of  New  York  City  which  were  not  commercially  available, 
He   specified   the   scale   to   be  used  and   the  altitude  from  which  the 
photographs  were   to   be   taken.     He  offered  $700  for   this  activity. 
Obviously   the  photographs  which  he   requested  would  depict   vital 
port  areas,    industrial  facilities,    and  military   installations   in 
the  New  York  area. 

For   this  brazen  abuse  of  his  diplomatic  privileges 
Fivnev  was  declared  persona  non  grata  on  May  29,   195^t   °^ 
departed  from  this  country  on  June  6,   195'^' 

But   this  did  not   stop  the  Soviets^     They  continued 
their   systematic  program  of  collecting  aerial   photographs  of 
major  cities  and   vital   areas  of  the  United  Stateso      On  January  19, 
1955!i    ifif  State  Department   sent  a  note   to   the  Soviet  Ambassador 
placing   restrictions  on  the  acquisition  of  certain  types  of  data 
by  Soviet  citizens   in  the  United  States.      These  restrictions 
were  comparable   to   restrictions  on  American  citizens   in  Russia 
and   in  part  prohibited  Soviet  citizens  from  obtaining  aerial 
photographs  except   where   they    "appear   in  or  are  appendices  to 
newspapers,   periodicals,    technical  Journals,   atlases  and  books 
commercially  available   to   the  general   publico" 

Soviet   reaction  to   the  restrictions  was  typical   of 
their  philosophy.      They  began  circumventing   the  restrictions 
by  subverting  Americans  to  purchase  aerial  photographs  for 
them.      One  month  after   the  restrictions  became  effective, 
Nikolai   I.   Trofimov,    a   Soviet  official    in  Mexico,    began  negoti- 
ations for  a   resident  of  the  west  coast  of  the  United  States 
to   obtain  aerial  photographs  of  4$  major  United  States  cities. 
Nineteen  of  these  cities  are  located  near  Strategic  Air  Command 
bases.      The   remaining  26  are  all    strategic  cities   in  or  near 
which  are  located  air  bases,    naval   bases,    research  or  training 
stations,   atomic   energy   installations  or   important    industrial 
facil I  ties. 

During  April,   195^>    Vladimir  D.  Loginov,   a   Soviet 
employee  of  the  United  Nations  used   the   same   technique  to 
obtain  an  aerial   map  of  New  York  City.     At  10  p.m.    on  April   26, 
195^t   Loginov   secretly  met  an   individual    in  a  darkened  parking 
lot  at   the  railroad   station   in  Scarsdale,   New  York,    where   this 
map  was  delivered   to  Loginov.     Months  later  on  November  1$,   195^> 
this  same  par-king  lot   was  again  utilized   by  the  Soviets  to 
obtain  aerial  photographs  of  Chicago,    Illinois,      On  this 
occasion,    the  photographs  were  turned  over   to  Kirill   S.   Doronkin, 
another  Soviet   employee  of  the  United  Nations.      In  this  same 
operation,    the  Soviets  attempted   to   obtain  aerial  photographs  of 
Portland,    Oregon;   Seattle,    Washington^  and  San  Diego  and  San 
Franc  I  SCO,    California. 

574Z5  O  -  60 

Circumvention  of   the  restrictions  also   took  the  form, 
of  trickery  and  deceits     For  example,    on  July   17,    1959,    Viktor  7, 
Fomin,    assistant  Soviet  military  attache  and  Anatoli  G.    Yasilev, 
an  employee   of  the   Soviet  Uilitary  Attache    in  Washington,    D,   C, 
obtained  an  aerial  photograph  of  the  Glasgow  Air  Force  Base    in 
Montana  from  the    local  Chamber   of  Commerce   by  posing  as 
tourists  without    identifying  themselves   as  Soviet   officials .      On 
July  24,    1959,    they   obtained  an  aerial  photograph  of  Thermopolis, 
Wyoming,    by  bullying  the  clerk  at  the  Chamber   of  Commerce    in  an 
arrogant  and   insistent  manney   again  posing  as   touristSc      They 
were  given  the  photograph    in  spite   of  the  fact  that   such  a 
photograph   is   not   normally  given  to   touristSo 

It   is   apparent  from  the   examples   cited   that  the  Soviet 
Union  reaps   the   benefits   of  aerial   reconnaissance   of  the  United 
States   just  as   surely  as    if  planes  were   sent  over  this   country. 

The   acquisition  of  aerial  photographs    is   only  one 
phase   of  Soviet~bloc    intelligence   activity   in  the  United  Spates, 
but  the  manner   in  which   it  has   been  done    illustrates  two   basic 
Soviet   intelligence   concepts^    namely,    to  exploit  the  weaknesses 
of  Amer icans  whenever  possible   and   to   take  full   advantage    of  all 
the  freedoms   of  our  democratic  society^ 

Following  these   concepts,    the  Soviets   through  the  use 
of  such  devices   as   entrapment,    blackmail,    threats,    and  promises 
have   exploited  human  frailty^      The   record    is   replete   with 
examples   of  such  exploitation  of  Americans   throughout  the   years 
following  the  Russian  Revolution   in  1917o     For  example, 
Nicholas  Dozenberg,    a   naturalised  American,   first  became 
associated  with  the   communist  movement  about   1920,      In  1928  he 
was   recruited    into  Soviet  espionage   activities  with  the   approval 
of  the  Communist  Party ,     He   was   recruited  by  one  Alfred  Tilton, 
who   was   an   illegal   agent  of  Soviet  Uilitary  Intelligence,   posing 
as   a  Canadian  citizen  and    in  possession  of  a  Canadian  passport. 
One   of  the   early  assignments  given  to  Dozenberg  was  the  sounding 
out  of  other  Americans  for   later  recruitment  by  Tilton. 
Dozenberg,    after  pleading  guilty  to   violations   of  the  passport 
laws,    served  a   term   in  prison   in  1940  and  thereafter  prior  to 
his  death  cooperated  with  United  States  Government  agencies. 

Simon  Rosenberg,   another  naturalized  American  of 
Polish  background,    during    29JI   loas  sent    to  Russia   by  his 
employer.      While   there,    he  met    representatives   of  a  Soviet 
intelligence  agency  and  under   threats   of  reprisals   to   be 
taken  against   his  sister     who  was    then   living    in  Russia,    he 
agreed   to  work   in   behalf  of   the  Russians   upon  his   return   to 
the   United  States.     His  principal   assignment    in   this   country 
was   to   obtain  technical  and   industrial    information,     Rosenberg, 
who    is  now  deceased,    also  cooperated  with  agencies   of   the 
Government,    prior  to  his  death,   as  have  many  other  Americans 
who  have  been   involved   in  Soviet    intelligence  activity. 

Another  example    is    the  case   of  Hafis  Salich,    a 
naturalized  American  employed   by  the  Office  of  Naixil  Intelligence 
in  California  who  met  Mikhail   N,    Gorin   through  a  mutual 
acquaintance   in  1937"      Gorin  was   then   the  Pacific   Coast 
manager  of  Intourist.      By  advancing  Salich  money,    Gorin 
ultimately  persuaded  him   to  furnish  Office  of  Naval  Intelligence 
reports  for  which  Gorin  paid  $1700.      Gorin  and  Salich  were  found 
guilty  of  espionage   in  1939  and  Salich  was  sentenced   to  four 
years   imprisonment,    which  he  served.      Gorin  appealed  his 
conviction  and  sentence   of  six   years    to    the  Supreme  Court   of   the 
United  States  which  unanimously  upheld   the  conviction    in   19^1; 
however,    the    trial   Judge  suspended   execution  of   the  sentence  and 
placed  him  on  probation  provided  he  would  pay  a  $10,000  fine  and 
leave   the   United  States,    never  to   return. 

The  decade  of  1950   -  196O  has   been  no   exception.      It 
began  with  the   trial  and  conviction  of  Valentin  Gubitchev,   a 
Soviet   employee   of   the   United  Nations  who  had   obtained    infor- 
mation from  Judith  Coplon,    an  employee  of  the  Department   of 
Justice.      This  conviction  was  soon  followed   by  convictions   of 
several   Soviet  agents    in   the  Julius  and  Ethel   Rosenberg  network 
in  1951  >    i>y  ihs  sentencing   of  Otto   Verber  and  Kurt  Ponger   in 
i9S3  o.fter  they  pleaded  guilty  to  espionage;    by  the  guilty  pleas 
of  espionage  by  Jack  and  Myra  Soble  and  Jacob  Albam    in  1957  <2^ 
later   in   the  same  year  the  conviction  of  Colonel  Rudolf  Abel,   a 
Soviet    illegal   agent    in   this   country. 

These  prosecutions,   although   they  clearly  establish 
the  nature  of  Soviet   espionage  activities  against      this  country, 
involve  only  a  part   of  the  Soviet-bloc   espionage  attack  which 
has    included  numerous  Soviet  attempts   to  penetrate  United  States 
Government  agencies.     For  example,    the  prosecution  of  Judith 
Coplon,    an  employee   of   the  Department   of  Justice    in  early  1950 
was  followed    in  October,    1950,    by  a  Soviet  assignment    to  Boris 
Morros,    an  American  motion  picture  producer  who  was  cooperating 
with   the  FBI,    to   revive  his  acquaintance  with  a  member  of   the 
United  States  Atomic  Energy  Commission;    to   obtain  compromising 

-  5  - 

information  oonaarning  thia    individual}  and  to  carefully 
explore   the  poaaibility  of  placing  a  aeoretary   in  hia  office 
who   could  furniah   infoimation  to  the  Ruaaiana.     Morroa 
previoualy   in  1948  had   been  given  the   aaaigment   to   attempt 
to  obtain  information  which  could  be  uaed  by  the  Ruaaiana    in 
an  effort  to  compromiae  United  Statea  General  Clay   in  Germany. 

Another  example   occurred  during   1954  when  Soviet 
intelligence   officera    in  Germany  approached  an  American  Army 
officer  atationed    in  Germany  who  waa   aoon  to  be   retired.      They 
propoaitioned  him  to  work  for  the  Sovieta  after  hia  return  to  the 
United  Statea  and   aet  up   a  achedule  for  meetinga    in  Hew  Tork  City. 
Purauant  to   the   arrangementa,  Uakaim  G,   Uartynov,    counaelor  of  the 
Soviet  Repreaentation  to  the  United  Nationa  Military  Staff 
Committee,    carried  out  a  aeriea  of  clandeatine  meetinga    in  New  Tork 
with  a  peraon  whom  he  believed  to  be  the  Amy  officer,     Aa   a 
reault  of  hia  abuae   of  hia  atatua,  Uartynov  waa  declared 
peraona  non  grata  on  February  21,    195S» 

Another  example    ia   that   of  Evgeniy  A,   Zaoatrovtaev, 
aecond  aecretary  of  the  Soviet  Bmbaaay  who  waa  declared  peraona 
non  grata  on  May  13,    1959,  for  attempting  to  aubvert  a  State 
Department  employee   to  obtain  ir\formation  from  State  Department 

A  more   recent  example  haa   been  previoualy  cited 
involving  the  attempt  by  Vadim  Kirilyuk,    an  employee   of  the 
United  Nationa,    to  penetrate  a  vital  Government  agency  by 
tnatructing  an  American  to   obtain  employment   in  that  agency. 

Soviet  attempta  to   recruit  Americana  during  thia  period 
have   not  been  confined  to  attempta  to    infiltrate  Government 
agenciea.     For  example,    in  February,    1954,    Igor  A.  Amoaov, 
aaaiatant  Soviet  naval  attache,   waa  declared  peraona   non  grata  for 
attempting  to   obtain   information  concerning  radar  and  United  Statea 
naval   veaaela  from  a  buaineaaman  who  had  commercial  dealinga  with 
the  Ruaaiana  and  who  waa    in  a  poaition  to  obtain  auch  data. 

In  June,    1956,   Ivan  A.   Bubchikov,    an  aaaiatant  Soviet 
military  attache  waa  declared  peraona  non  grata  for  attempting 
to  obtain  data  regarding  radar,    guided  miaailea,   jet  fuela  and 
atomic  aubmariTiea  from  an  American  buaineaaman  who  during  World 
War  II  had  extenaive  contacta  with  the  Ruaaiana   on  both  private 
and  United  Statea  Government  buaineaa.     The  Sovieta  attempted 
to  exploit  hia   World  War  II  friendlineaa. 

In  Auguat,    1956,    Viktor  I,  Petrov,    a  Soviet  tranalator 
at  the  United  Nationa,   waa  releaaed  from  hia  employment  for 
recruiting  an  employee   of  an  American  aviation  company  to   obtain 
claaaified  data  regarding  United  Statea   aircraft. 

-  5  - 


Only  a  few  of  the  many  examples  of  abuse   of  their  diplomatic 
privileges  by  Soviet-bloc   officials   in  the   United  States  have  been 
mentioned*      In   the  more  flagrant   cases,    the   United  States  Government 
has  asked   the   offending   officials   to    leave   this  country.      During   the 
decade,    195^  -   19^0,    19  Soviet   officials  have  been  asked   to   leave. 
Many  more  have  been  engaged   in   intelltgence  activities  throughout 
the  years* 

The  Soviet    Ifiiion  has  maintained  a   large  staff  of  officials 
in  this  country  since   its  first   recognition   in  1933*      These   officials 
have  been  assigned   to  Soviet   embassies,    consulates,    trade  delegations, 
news  media,    the   IMited  Nations,   and   the  Amtorg  Trading  Corporation, 
It    is  from  these   installations  that   the  primary   intelligence  activities 
are  directed  against   the   Ifiiited  States,      A  former  Soviet    intelligence 
officer  who  defected  from  the  Soviets  has  estimated   that  from  yC^o 
to  SOPjo  of  the  Soviet    officials   in  the   United  States  have  some   type 
of  intelligence  assignment.      Other  defectors  have  confirmed   that   a 
high  per  cent   of  the  officials  are   intelligence  agents.      As  of  May  1, 
i960,    there  were  328  Soviet   officials  stationed   in  this  country.      They 
were  accompanied  by  4$^  dependents,   many  of  whom  are  also  potential 
intelligence  agents. 

Nor  is  this  the  full  strength  of  Soviet-bloc   intelligence. 
As   of  May  1,    I96O,    there  were  272  satellite   officials  stationed   in 
the   United  States  accompanied  by  435  dependents.      This  almost  doubles 
the  potential  of  Soviet    intelligence  services.      The  satellite 
intelligence  services  have  been  developed  according   to   the  Soviet 
pattern,    their  personnel  selected   or  approved   by  the  Soviets  and 
they  are   trained  and  guided  by  Soviet  policies  and  procedures. 
Recent  defectors  from  satellite   intelligence  services  have  advised 
that   the  Soviets  have  access   to  all  data  obtained  by  the  satellites 
and,    in  fact,   maintain  an  advisor  system  at  headquarters  level   to 
make  certain  that    the  satellites  operate  consistent  with  Soviet 

This  coordination   is  not   limited   to  headquarters' 
levels.      Beginning   in  November,    195^,    the  Soviet   and 
satellite  military,    naval  and  air  attaches  stationed   in 
the   United  States  began  a  series  of  monthly  meetings  under 
the  guidance  of  the  Soviet  military  attache.        During  this 

-  7  ' 

initial  meeting  the  satellite   representatives  were  given 
specific   target  assignments  for   the   collection  of  information 
desired  by   the  Soviets  and  arrangements   were  made  for   the 
over-all   correlation  of  their  activities. 


This   large  group  of  Soviet-bloc   officials 
stationed   in   the  United  States  has  systematically  over   the 
years  developed  a  most    important  part   of  the  modern 
intelligence  machine  which  was    referred   to   by  one  Soviet 
official  as    the  best    industrial   spying  system   in   the 
world.      Volumes   could  be  written  as    to   the   techniques 
used  and   the  ways  and  means  developed  by   the  Soviet   bloc 
to   obtain   information  regarding   the    industrial   potential 
of  the   United  States   often  with   the  use   of  subterfuge 
and  deceit  as  well  as  deliberate  circumvention  of  Customs 

The  following  examples   illustrate   this 
activi ty: 

In  1924   the  Amtorg  Trading  Corporation  vxis 
organized   in  New  York  for   the  purpose   of  acting  as  an 
importer  and  exporter  on   the  North  American  continent  for 
official    trusts    of  the  Soviet   Union.      Amtorg  continued   to 
operate  during  World  War  II,    although   in  1942  the  Soviet 
Government   created   the  Soviet  Government  Rirchasing 
Commission   in  Washington,    D^    C,    to  purchase  war  material. 
This  Purchasing  Commission  ivas  dissolved  after   the  end  of 
World  War  II,    and   its  activities  absorbed  by  Amtorg, 
Since    its   organization,   Amtorg  Trading  Corporation  has 
been  staffed  primarily  by  representatives   of   the  Soviet 
Government  who  have   official   status.      Former  employees   of 
Amtorg  have  advised   that   it  was   standard  practice  for 
Soviets  attached    to  Amtorg    to   request  permissi on  for  Soviet 
officials    to   visit    industrial  facilities    throughout    the 
country  on    the  promise   of  orders    to  be  forthcoming    if   the 
products  were  found  satisfactory.      In  many   instances   the 
officials   of   the  companies  would  later  be  advised  by 
Amtorg   that  Moscow  would  have    to  approve    the   order.      In 
instances  where  a   contract  lias   given   to  a  particular 
company,    Amtorg   consistently  demanded  blueprints   of  the 
particular  product  and   other  data    to  which   it  was  not 

entitled  by  normal   business  practices.     Amtorg  officials 
also   consistently   insisted   on  a   clause    in    the   contract 
which  would  give  Soviet    inspectors   the  privilege   of 
inspecting  all    of  the  merchandise   before    it   was   shipped 
to  Russia. 

Another  device  utilized   by  Amtorg   officials   was 
to  gain   the   confidence   of  some  employee    in  a  plant  which 
had  a   contract  with  the  Russian  Government  and,    through 
this   employee,    obtain  blueprints  which  were   copied   in   the 
Amtorg   office  and    the   copies  forwarded   to  Russia.      Amtorg 
officials   would  also  advertise  for  employees  who,    when   they 
appeared  for  an   interview  at    the  Amtorg   office,    would   be 
instructed    to   bring  proof  of  their  ability   in   the  form  of 
blueprints    of  former  projects.      When   the  applicants  for 
employment   later  showed  up  with  the  blueprints,    the 
blueprints  would  be  photographed  and   the  photographs 
forwarded    to  Russia. 

Amtorg  has  also  followed  a  practice  of  preparing 
detailed  catalogues  concerning  American   industry.      Congressman 
Mxndt   on  January  29,    194^,    described   one   of   these  catalogues 
as    "a   manual  for  bombing  America. "     It   was  pointed   out   that 
the  book  contained  detailed   information   including  many 
photographs  and  maps   of  vital   areas   of   the  United  States. 
In   this   connection  Amtorg  Trading  Corporation  during   the 
1940's  prepared  a  monthly  magazine   called    "American 
Engineering  and  Industry"  and  an  annual   guide   called 
"Catalogue   of  American  Engineering  and   Industry.  "  This 
latter  publication  in  1946  was  described  as  a    three-volume, 
S, OOO-page  document. 

In  August,    195^>    Milos  Frochazka,    a   Czechoslovakian 
official   assigned    to   the  Commercial    Office  at    the  Czech 
Embassy,   furnished   to  an  American   the  specifications  for   the 
components    of  2  steel  mills    to   be  purchased    in   the   United 
States  for   the  Czechs.      He   outlined  a  plan  whereby   the  American 
would  act  as  an  exclusive  agent    to  purchase    these  mills 
ostensibly  for  a  private   concern   in  a   Western  country.      He 
would   obtain  estimates  and    if   the   estimates  were   approved, 
the  Czechs   would  furnish   the  name   of   the  purchasing 
company,    a  power  of  attorney  and   the   necessary  bank  credit. 
Thereafter,    the  mills   would   be  shipped    to    the   Czech  agent    in 
the  Western  country  and    then   transshipped    to  Czechoslovakia. 

-  9  - 


It   is  no  secret   that   one  of  the   results   of  the 
freedom  of  our  democratic  society   is   the  availability  of 
voluminous   information   to  members   of  the  public  merely 
for  the  asking.      Some  of  the  cases  previously  cited  clearly 
indicate   that   the  Soviet-bloc   intelligence  services  are 
aware  of  this  fact  and  have   taken  full   advantage  of  this 
democratic  freedom;   however,    it   remains  for  former 
Soviet-bloc   intelligence   officers   to   testify  as   to   its 
real   significance  and   importance   to   the  Soviet-bloc 
intelligence  services.      One  defector  has   stated   that   the 
ease  with  which   information   is   obtained   in   this   country 
has   resulted   in  a   reduction  of  the  hazardous  and   time- 
consuming  clandestine  operations  which  would  otherwise 
be  necessary.      Another  has   estimated   that    the  Soviet 
Military  Attache's   office    in  the  United  States   is  able   to 
legally  obtain  9$%  of  the  material  useful  for   its   intelligence 
objectives.     He  stated   that,    in  fact,    90^  of  an   intelligence 
agent's   time   in  any  other  country   in   the  world  would 
normally  be  consumed  clandestinely  obtaining   information 
which   is   readily  available   in   the  United  States   through 
Government  agencies   or  commercial  publishing  houses.      He 
pointed  out   that  Polish  military   intelligence   obtains 
more   technical  data    in   the  United  States    than  from  all    the 
other  countries    in   the  world  combined. 

Although  such   information   is  collected   in  a 
number  of  ways,    the  following   techniques   in  addition   to 
those  previously  mentioned  have  been  most  productive. 

One   of  the  most   useful    techniques   is  attendance 
at   conventions  of  American  organizations   by  Soviet-bloc 
officials.      During   the  year  preceding  FChrushchev  '  s   visit 
to   this   country,    Soviet   officials  alone  attended 
approximately  JO  conventions  covering  various  fields   of 
endeavor   including  aeronautics,    electronics,    plastics 
development,    education  and   others^      Typical   were   the 
activities   of  2  Soviets  who  attended   the   Western  Electric 
convention  held    in  Los  Angeles  during  August,    1959'      As 
usual,    at   the   inception,    they  began   to  collect  voluminous 
literature.      When   the  volume  became  unwieldy  one  Soviet 
left   the  material  at  a   check  stand  and  resumed  his 
collection  activities.      It  was  estimated   that   the  literature 
picked  up  by  these  Soviets  at   this  one  convention  weighed 
approximately  2^0  pounds. 


Another  technique  utilized   is   correspondence  with 
chambers   of  commerce  and   industrial  facil i  ties   throughout 
the  United  States    through  which  voluminous    information 
regarding   transportation  systems,    major   industries,    etc., 
is   obtained.      In  many  instances  useful   maps   of  the  areas 
are  also  secured. 

Still  another  technique   is    the  subscription   to 
American  publications  and  collection  and   review  of 
United  States  Government  documents.     For  example,   during 
June,    1959>    '*  ""s  ascertained   that   the  personnel   of  the 
Soviet  Military,    Naval   and  Air  Attache   Offices  subscribed 
to  44  newspapers  and  S^  magazines   of  a   technical,   scientific, 
military  and  general   news   nature.      It    is  apparent    that    the 
Soviets   have  a  definite  program  of  subscribing   to 
newspapers  published  at   or   in   the  vicinity  of  vital 
United  States  military  bases. 

Purchases  from   the   United  States  Government 
have  long  been  a  productive  source  for  Soviet-bloc 
intelligence.     For  example,    on  December  28,    19^^f    the 
Soviet   Government  Purchasing  Commission   in  Washington,    D.    C, 
ordered  copies   of  5,8l0  patents.      On   the  same  date   the 
New  York  office   of  this  Commission  purchased   two  copies   of 
18,000  patents.      On  January  1,    194$,    the  Soviet  Government 
Purchasing  Commission   in  Washington  again  ordered  copies 
of  5/J^^  different  patents.      On  January  12,    19'^5>    copies 
of  41, 812  patents  were   ordered.      The  next   order  was  for 
41,810.      The  acquisition   of  copies   of  patents   has   been 
continued   throughout   the  years  as   illustrated  by  the  fact 
that   in  early  1959  Anatoli   G.    Vasilev,   an  employee  of  the 
Office   of   the  Soviet  Military  Attache,    requested  an  American 
to   instruct  him  in  the  use   of  the    "Search  Room"  of  the 
United  States  Patent   Office  so   that  he  could  locate  patents 
in  which  he  was    interested. 

The  Soviets   have,    of  course,    not    restricted 
themselves    to    the  acquisition   of  patents.      For  example,    on 
Mirch  10,    195'^>    o^  Assistant  Soviet  Air  Attache  purchased 
"The  Pilot's  Handbook"  for  the  East  and  West  Coasts   of   the 
United  States  from  the  United  States  Coast  and  Geodetic 
Survey  of  the  Department   of  Commerce.      On  Mirch  12,    195^t 
a   chauffeur  of  the  Soviet  Air  Attache  purchased    "The 
Pilot's  Handbook"  for  Canada  and  Alaska.      Six  days   later 
an  Assistant  Soviet  Attache   ordered    "The  Pilot's  Handbook" 
for   the  Far  Fast  and  Europe.      These   handbooks   contained 

-    11   - 

57425  O  -  60 

diagrams   of  all   of  the  principal  airfields  and   the 
approaches  used   in  landing  planes. 

In  April,   19$4,  Soviet  officials  stationed 
in  Washington  obtained  from  the  iiip   Information  Office 
of  the   U.   S.    Geological  Survey,   Department  of  the  Interior, 
topographic  maps  covering  North  Carolina,   Michigan,    Illinois, 
Kentucky,    and  an  area  within  a  ^0-miIe   radius   of 
Washington,   D.    C. 

This  collection  activity  has   continued  unabated 
up   to   the  present   time.      Literally  thousands  of  similar 
documents  are  obtained   in   this   country  every  year  by 
Soviet-bloc   officials  assigned   in   this  country  and   through 
registered  agents  such  as   the  Four  Continent  Book  Corporation 
and   the  Tass  News  Agency. 

A  statement   of  a  satellite  defector   illustrates 
the  value   to   the  Soviet-bloc  of  IMited  States  Government 
publications.      He  stated   that   on  one   occasion,   Polish 
military   intelligence   obtained  an  id-volume  edition 
prepared  by   the   United  States  Army  Engineers    regarding 
United  States  port  facilities.      It  uxis  purchased  from 
the  Government  Printing   Office  at  nominal   cost,    but    its 
estimated  value   to   the  Polish  military   intelligence  was 
placed  at  $$0,000. 

Not  content  with  the  large  volume   of  publicly 
available  material,   Soviet-bloc  officials  have  resorted 
to  deceit.     For  example,    on  November  $,    195&>    ^on 
Dubesteanu,    an  assistant  military  attache   of  the  Rumanian 
Legation   in  Washington,   !>.  C,    was  declared  persona  non 
grata  for  activity  beyond   the  scope  of  his   official  duties. 
Using  a  false  name  and   identity,  Dubesteanu  had  corresponded 
with  U.    S.    military   installations  soliciting  material   and 
had  rented  post   office  boxes  at  North  Beach,    Miry  land,    under 
assumed  names   to  which  such  material   was   to  be  sent. 

Reconnaissance   trips  by  Soviet-bloc   officials  have 
been  a  most  productive  source   of  intelligence.      The 
officials  have  been  observed   to  carefully  prepare  for  such 
trips   by  reviewing  publications  collected    in   this   country, 
doing  research  at   the  Library  of  Congress,    et  cetera. 
Exclusive   of  trips  from  Washington,   D.    C,    to  New  Fork  City, 
officials   of  the  Soviet  Military   Office  alone    took  l6  trips 


to  various  areas  of  the  country   in  1958  and   1959*      They  visited 
26  states   in   I958  and  37  in   1959,      They  covered  most   of  the 
strategic  areas  of  the  country  and  covered  some  areas  as  many  as 
four  times.      During   these   trips   they  followed  a  definite  pattern 
of  visiting  chambers  of  commerce,   driving  around    the  perimeter 
of  industrial  facilities  and  wherever  possible  circled  military, 
naval  and  air   installations   in  the  areas  visited.      They  collected 
all  available   literature  and  maps   relating  to   industrial  facilities, 
transportation  systems,  power  plants,   dams,    chemical  factories, 
et   cetera,   and  wherever  possible   took  photographs   in  addition  to 
making   extensive  notes, 


Exploitation  of  our  freedoms  has  also   taken  the  form 
of  propaganda.     Not   content  with  the  distribution  of  over  20,000 
copies  of  the   illustrated  monthly  magazine,    "USSi,"  which   is   in 
reciprocity  for  distribution  of  a  similar  American  magazine   in 
the  Soviet    Union,    the  Soviet  Embassy  has  a  carefully  planned 
program  of  distributing  press  releases.      As  of  February,    I96O, 
the  Press  Department   of  the  Soviet  Embassy  was  distributing 
press  releases  to  almost  7,000   individuals  and    institutions   in 
the  United  States,    including  newspaper  editors,    business  leaders, 
radio  stations,  public  libraries,    television  stations,    teachers, 
labor  leaders,    scientists,   and   leaders   in  trade  and  commerce. 

In  addition,    since  January  1,    1959 >  JO  different 
officials  attached   to  the  Soviet  Embassy  have  made,    or  were 
scheduled   to  make,   74  public  appearances   (not    including  7 
additional   invitations  for  appearances  by  the  Soviet  Ambassador) 
before  various  groups   in  this  country.     Nineteen  other  Soviets 
attached   to   the  Soviet  Delegation  to   the   United  Nations,    employed 
by  the   Ifiiited  Nations  Secretariat   or  assigned   to  Intourist,   made, 
or  were  scheduled   to  make,  39  public  appearances  during  the  same 

These  public  appearances  normally   involved  speeches  or 
participation   in  fonans  on  the  part   of  the  Soviet   officials  and 
were  made  before  various  types   of  groups,    including  high  school, 
college,    and  university  groups,  parent-teacher  associations, 
advertisement   and  civic  clubs,   fraternities,  professional  associa- 
tions  or  clubs,    religious  and  cultural  groups,    travel  clubs  arid 
community  centers.      Some   of  these  were   television  appearances.      It 
is  apparent    that    the  Soviets  are   taking   every  opportunity   to   spread 
the  gospel   of  communism  by  exploitation  of  the    intense  desire   of 
Americans  to  learn  more  about    the  Soviet   JMion, 

~    13  - 

8.       USE  OF  TfJK  mTTTEn  NATIONS 

Attention   is  called   to   the  fact   that  many  of  the 
incidents  and  cases  previously  cited   involved  Soviet  employees 
of  the  United  Nations.      They  are  guests  of  the  United  States  and 
are  supposedly  dedicated   to   the   cause  of   international   peace   but 
they  are,    in  fact,    carefully  selected  envoys  of  the    international 
communist  conspiracy,    trained    in   trickery  and  deceit  and  dedicated 
to   the  concept  of  fully  exploiting   the  freedoms  of  the  countries 
they  seek   to  destroy.      It    is   too  much   to   expect   that   they  toould 
not  prostitute   the  United  Nations, 


Although  Soviet-bloc    intelligence  services  have  made 
extensive  use  of  their  officials  stationed   in  foreign  countries 
for  espionage  purposes  throughout   the  years,    they  have,    in 
addition,    operated  a  parallel  clandestine  espionage  system  knovn 
as   the    "illegal"  system.     As  previously  noted,    "illegal"  Soviet 
agents  were  dispatched   to   the  United  States  as  early  as   the   1920 's. 
Such   "illegal"  agents  have  no   ostensible   connection  with   the 
Soviet-bloc  official   establishments    in   the   United  States,    but 
operate  clandestinely,    usually  under  false    identities,    making 
full  use  of  secret   communications  channels  and  other  clandestine 
techniques  of  operation.      Their  dual  function   is   to   bolster  the 
espionage  activities  of  the  Soviet-bloc  officials  and   to  be 
prepared   to   take   over  all   espionage   operations   in   the   event  of 
war  or  other  emergency  which  would  cause  a  break    in  diplomatic 

It    is  apparent   that  during   the  decade   19^0-1960  the 
Soviets  have  placed   increasing  emphasis  on   "illegal"  operations. 
One  former   intelligence  officer  of  the  Soviet  Ministry  of  State 
Security  has  advised   that  a  special  directorate   was  created   in 
19^7  for  the  purpose  of  handling   "illegal"  agents.     Another  former 
intelligence  officer,   Reino  Hayhanen,   has  stated   that  he  was   told, 
while    in  Moscow  in  1952,    that  plans  were   being  made   to   change   over 
Soviet   contacts  from   "legal"   to    "illegal"  operations.      Another 
former  officer  of  the  Soviet  Ministry  of  State  Security  has 
advised   that   as  early  as  June,    1952>    an   order  was  sent    to 
intelligence  agents   in  all   western  countries   to  prepare   "illegal" 
organizations  which  could  function  without    interruption  under 
any  conditions. 

That   this  policy  was  followed  with  respect   to   the 
United  States   is   illustrated  by  the  fact   that   in  August,    195^t 
a  female  Soviet  agent  attempted   to  enter  the  United  States  from 

■^    14   = 

Canada^ at  Detroit  using  an  authentic  copy  of  a   birth  certificate 
previously    issued   to  an  American,.      Detected   by   the   United  States 
border  screening  process,    she   was   refused  entry ^     Less   than  a 
year  later,    Rudolf   J.  Abel,    a   colonel    in    the  Soviet    Committee   of 
State   Security,    was  arrested    in  New  York   City  where  he   was   posing 
as  an  American  photographer  under   the  name  Emil  R.    Qoldfus.      Abel 
had  entered   the   United  States   in  19'^8  using  a  passport    issued   to 
a  naturalized  American    in   IS'^?  to   visit   relatives  behind   the 
Iron   Curtain  and  who  never  returned    to    this   country.      Abel   was 
subsequently  convicted  of  espionage  and  sentenced   to  JO  years 
imprisonment,    which  sentence  he    is  now  serving. 

It    is   interesting   to  note   that    in  October,    19^2, the 
Soviets  sent  Reino  Hayhanen   to   the   United  States   to  act  as  Abel's 
assistant,      Hayhanen,    prior   to   leaving  Russia,    had  been  given 
instructions  by  Mikhail  N.    Svirin,    a  Soviet    intelligence  officer. 
After  his  arrival    in   this  country,    Svirin,    who  had   become  First 
Secretary  of  the  Soviet  Delegation   to   the   United  Nations,   met 
with  Hayhanen  and  subsequently,    during    the   period   1952-19$3, 
Hayhanen  operated  under  his  supervision.      It   was  not  until   195^ 
that  Svirin  gave    instructions  for  Hayhanen   to   contact  Abel  and 
to  act  as  Abel's  assistant. 

The   case    involving  Abel  and  Hayhanen    is  a  striking 
example   of  Soviet  use  of   "illegal"  agents  against   the   United 
Stateso      In  dispatching  such  agents   to   this  country,    we   can  be 
certain   that   the  Soviet-bloc    intelligence  services  will,   as 
they  have   with   their  representatives  who  are  dispatched   to   this 
country  as  diplomats,    take  full  advantage  of  the  freedoms  of 
this  country  which  are  guaranteed  by  our  Constitution. 


The   United  States  has  not   been   the   only   target 
of  the  Soviet-bloc    intelligence  organizations.     Many  other 
countries  of  the   world  have  felt   the   barbs  of  the  Soviet 
espionage  attack.      The  disclosures  of   the  Royal   Commission 
in   Canada  which  followed   the   194^  defection  of  Igor  Gcuzenko, 
a  Soviet   code  clerk,    revealed  a  Soviet   espionage  apparatus  which 
on  a   broad  scale  had   recruited  and  subverted  Canadian  citizens 
while  seeking   to    infiltrate   the   Canadian  Government  and  drain 
off   its  secrets.      The  admissions  of  Klaus  Fuchs   in  1950  that 
he   betrayed   the  free  world  when,    as  a  member  of  the  British 
Atomic  Energy  Team,    he  passed  atomic  secrets   to   the  Russians 
clearly   indicate   the   Soviet  designs  on    information   in  possession 
of  the  British  Government,,      The  flight   of  the  British  scientist 
Dr.   Bruno  Pontecorvo    in  195^  o.nd   the  British  diplomats  Guy 

-  75  = 

Burgess  and  Donald  MacLean   in  19^1   behind   the   Iron   Curtain 
adds  additional   proof.      The    report   of  the  Royal    Commission   of 
the   Commonwealth  of  Australia    in   19$^^  following   the  defection 
of  Vladimir  and  ffvdokia  Petrov,    Soviet   espionage  agents  assigned 
to   the  Soviet  Embassy   in  Australia,   disclosed  an  extensive 
Soviet   espionage  apparatus  directed  against  Australia.      Many 
similar  examples  could  be   cited   to    illustrate   that  Soviet 
espionage    is    international    in  character  and   the   expulsion  of 
two  Soviet   officials  from  Switzerland  during   the  past  month 
clearly   indicates   that  Soviet   espionage    is  currently   inter- 
national   in  character. 

Practically  every  one  of  the   cases  cited  above, 
although  based    in   other  countries,    had   ramifications    in    the 
United  States.      For  example,    information  furnished   to    the 
Russians  by  Dr.   Allan  Minn  May,    who   was  uncovered  by 
Gouzenko,    had  been  obtained  when  May  visited  a   laboratory   in 
Chicago    in   1944.      Klaus  Fuchs  worked  on  atomic   energy   in   the 
United  States  from  early  1944   through  September,    19^5>    ond 
supplied    information   to    the  Russians  while    in    this  country. 
The  British  diplomats  Burgess  and  MacLean  had  been  stationed 
in   the  United  States  prior   to   their  disappearance   behind   the 
Iron  Curtain.      In  spite   of  the  use   of  third  countries  by  the 
Soviet  Union   to   ccmmit  espionage  against   the  United  States, 
Premier  Khrushchev  has  made  strong   threats  of  reprisal 
against  his  neighboring  countries  which  he  assumes  have   been 
used  as  bases  for  United  States  aerial    reconnaissance  of  the 
Soviet  Union. 


The   world-wide   espionage  networks  of   the  Soviet  Union 
are  an  essential   and   integral  part   of  the   over-all   communist 
plan   to   completely  dominate    the   world.     However,    to  understand 
the   significance   of  the    intelligence  activity,    it    is  necessary 
to   examine    the   basic  aims  and  principles  of  communism. 

The  highly  authoritative    "History  of  the   Communist 
Party  of  the  Soviet  Union    (Bolsheviks)"  summarized   the   teachings 
of  Marx  and  Engels  on   the   question   of  for   j  and   violence.      It 
stressed   that  Marx  and  Engels   taught   the    impossibility  of 
establishing  a  communist  state  by  peaceful  means,    emphasizing 
that   this  could  be  achieved  only  through  a  proletarian 
revolution   through  which  a  dictatorship  could  be   established 
and  all   resistance  crushed.      V.    I.   Lenin  gave  practical 
application   to   the   teachings  of  Marx  and  Engels.      Through 
the  application  of  such  principles   the  Bolsheviks  seized  power 

"    16  - 

in  Russia   in  191?  and  under  Lenin's  guidance,    established  a 
dictatorship   through  which  all    resistance   was  systematically 
crushed^      The   success  of   the  movement   led  Lenin   to   reiterate 
in  later  years    that    "The   substitution   of  the   proletarian  state 
for   the   bourgeois  state    is    impossible   without  a   violent 
revolution. " 

Joseph  Stalin  followed   the  Marxist-Leninist 
principles.      The   Communist  Party   in   the  United  States,    since 
it  was  organized    in  September,    'l919>    and   throughout   the   years 
of  Stalin's   rule    in  Russia,    was  unalterably  bound   to  Moscow. 
In   the   earlier  years.    Party  leaders  openly,    boastfully  and 
defiantly  proclaimed   their  allegiance    to  and  support   of  Soviet 
objectives.      The  nature   of   the    Communist  Party,    USA,    was 
exposed    in   19^9  CLnd    its  leaders  convicted    in  a   court   of  law 
where    the   evidence   laid  out   before    the  jury  constituted 
irrefutable   proof   that    the   Communist  Party,    USA,    advocated   the 
overthrow  and  destruction   of   the   Government   of  the  United  States 
by  force  and   violence.      The  policies  and  activities  of   the 
Communist  Party,    USA,    have  not   changed    to  dateo      The   current 
leaders  of  the   Communist  Party,    like   their  predecessors, 
unwaveringly  follow  the   lead  of  the   Communist  Party  of  the 
Soviet   Union, 

Time  and  again,    Soviet  Premier  Khrushchev  has 
claimed   that   the  Soviet   Union  does  not  and  will  not    interfere 
in   the  affairs  of  other  nations.      Yet,    in  practically  every 
country    in   the   world   to  date    the  Soviet   Union  has   established 
fifth  columns    in   the  form   of  Communist  Parties  which  are   under 
the   complete  domination  and   control   of   the   Soviets  and  are 
sworn   to   uphold  and  aid    the  Soviet  dream  for  world  conquest. 
Through   the  directives   it  furnishes   to   these   subversive  forces, 
the  Soviet   Union   clearly    interferes  with   the   political,    social, 
and  economic  affairs  of  other  nations   on  a   continuing   basis    in 
the   relentless  drive   toward  world  domination. 

Today,    the   rallying  cry  of  world  communism    is 
"peaceful   coexistence."     However,    on  May  $,    19^0,   Premier 
lOirushchev,    addressing   the  Supreme  Soviet    in  Moscow,    paid 
tribute    to   V.    T.   Lenin  and  stated    "The  Soviet   people  are 
proud   to  know  that   the   cause   of  our  great   leader  and   teacher 
lives  and   triumphs  and   that  Lenin's  dreams  are   being   translated 
into   reality ^y  hundreds  and  millizAS  of  people--builders  of 
socialism  and  communism --and   that  Lenin's  cause    is  winning  all 
upright  men   on  earth."     Referring    to    the    triumph  of   the    ideas 
of  Marx,   Engels,   and  Lenin,   Khrushchev  toent   on   to   reaffirm 
"Marxist-Leninist    ideas"  as   the  guide   to   the  ultimate   triumph 
of  world  communism. 

^   17  ' 

Thus,    the  fact   remains   that   the   basic  principles 
of  Marxist-Leninist  philosophy,    demanding   the  use   of  force  and 
violence ,    represent   the  guides  for  communism   to  achieve  world 
conquest,      27ie   extensive  espionage  activities  directed  against 
the   IMited  States  which,    in   the  past,    have  utilized  communists 
and  communist  sympathizers   in   this  country  as  well  as  other 
individuals  who   could  be   subverted,    can  be   better  understood 
when   regarded  as  essential    tools   in   the   relentless  and  fanatical 
drive  of  international   communism   to   conquer  the  world. 

18   - 



There  are  set  forth  hereinafter  cases  which  have 
been  presented   to  Federal   Courts    in   the  United  States  during 
the  past   ten  years  and  which  unquestionably  reveal  Soviet 
efforts   to  steal   American  secrets  affecting    the  national 
security  of  this  country.      All    these  cases  have  withstood 
the  exacting   test   of  being   tried  under  the  democratic  system 
of  the  American  courts  and   the  convictions  obtained  are 
ample  proof  of   the  charges  made. 


57425  O  -  60  -  4 

A.      Soviet   Infiltration  of  the  United  States  Government 

a.     Testimonu  of  Elizabeth  T„   Bentleu 

In  November,    19^5t   Elizabeth  T.   Bentl ey  dis- 
closed operations  of  two   extensive  Soviet    intelligence 
networks   in  United  States  Government  agencies  during 
World  War  II.      She   stated  the  networks  were  under  the 
control   of  officials  of  Soviet   establishments   in  the 
United  States  and   involved  a  number  of  employees  of  the 
United  States  Government.      She  added  one  of  the  networks 
was  headed  by  Nathan  Gregory  Silvermaster,   a  United 
States  Government   employee   in  Washington,   D.    C.,   and  the 
second  network  was  under  the  direction  of  Victor  Perlo, 
also  a  United  States  Government   employee. 

Elizabeth  Bentley  fiad  been  engaged   in  communist 
activities  enuring   the    1930s,    and   in    193^  became  acquainted 
with  Jacob  Golos  whose   true  name  was  Jacob  Raisin.      Golos 
was  head  of  World  Tourist,    Incorporated,    and  utilized 
that   organization   to   arrange   travel  for  communists  and 
Soviet  agents.      Upon   instructions  from  Golos,    a  cover 
agency  for  Soviet    intelligence  operations  was  established 
under   the  name  of  the  United  States  Service  and  Shipping, 
Incorporated,   and  Elizabeth  T,   Bentley  became  an  official 
of  that  company.      Under   the  direction  of  Golos,   Bentley, 
in   19^1,    began  collecting    information  for  Soviet    intel- 
ligence from  sources   in  Washington,   Do    Co,   and  her   role 
became  more   important  due   to    the   ill    health  of  Golos  as  time 
went  on.     After  the  death  of  Golos   in  November,    19^3:) 
Bentley  continued  her  operations   in  Soviet   espionage,  first 
consulting  with  Earl   Browder,    then  head  of  the  American 
Communi st  Party,    whom  she  had  previously  met   through 
Golos.      The  activities  of  Bentley  consisted  of  collecting 
information  from  various   individuals  who   were  employed 
by  United  States  Government  agencies  and  the    information 
covered  a   variety  of  subjects   including  aircraft  produc- 
tion data,   data  concerning  financial   activities  particularly 
as  they  related   to  foreign  commitments  of  the  United  States, 
information  from  the  Foreign  Economic  Administration,    the  j 

War  Production  Board,    the  Justice  Department,    the  Board  of 
Economic  Warfare  and  numerous  other  sources. 


During   the  course  of  her   intelligence  operations 
for   the  Soviets,   Elizabeth  T.   Bentley,    met  Anatoli  B. 
Gromov,   First   Secretary  of  the   Soviet   Embassy,    Washington, 
D.    C,    and  upon    instructions  from  Gromov,    one  of  Bentley' s 
Soviet    intelligence  superiors,   Bentley  ceased  regular 
courier  operations   in  December,    19"^-      In   the  Fall    of    1945t 
Bentley  had   tun   meetings  with  Anatoli  B.    Gromov  and  on   the 
occasion  of  one  of  these  meetings  he  paid  her  $2,000  for 
past   services.     Much  of  the   information  furnished  by 
Elizabeth  T.    Bentley  has  been  corroborated  and   shows  that 
the   Soviet    intelligence   service  was  receiving  a   volume  of 
information  from  persons  named   by  Bentley  from  the  files  of 
United  States  Government  agencies   in  Washington,   Do    C.      The 
individuals  named   by  Bentley,   for   the  most  part,    have   sought 
refuge   behind   the  Fifth  Amendment  of  the   Constitution  of  the 
United  States  when  questioned  by  Government    investigative  com- 
mittees and  official    Government    sources  concerning   their 
act ivitieso 

1 .     The  Case  of  Edward  Josevh  Fitzgerald 

In  November,    19^^,   Elizabeth  T,   Bentley  advised 
that   early   in    19^,    through  arrangements  with  Earl  Browder, 
then  head  of  the  American  Communist  Party,    she   met  a 
group  of  individuals   in  New  York  City   including  one 
Edward  Joseph  Fitzgerald,      Fitzgerald  was  born   in    1911 
in  New  York  City  and  was  employed   by   the  United   States 
Government  from    193^  *o    19^7  in   several    Government 

Elizabeth  T,   Bentley   stated   that    these    individuals 
talked  freely   in  her  presence,    that   there  was  di  3cussicn 
as  to   the  payment   of  Communi st  Party  dues  to  Elizabeth 
To   Bentley  and  a  general   discussion  as  to   the  type  of 
information  each  person  could  furnish,     Fitzgerald,    who 
was  at   that   time  associated  with  the  War  Production 
Board,    an  agency  of  the  United  States  Gove'^nment, 
indicated  he  could   supply  Bentley  with  miscellaneous 
statistics  that   came   to   his  attention.      She  later  met 
Fitzgerald  on  four  or  five  occasions   in  New  York  City 
and  on  these  occasions  Fitzgerald  was  acting  as  a 
representative  of  the   Victor  Perlo  group   in  bringing 
information  to  Bentley. 

-  21   - 

Subsequent    investigation  of  Fitzgerald 
showed  him   to  have  been   in  contact   with  numerous 
individuals  mentioned  by  Bentley  and  also  disclosed 
that  he  was  associated  with  other   individuals  who 
were  reported   to  be  communists  or  pro-Soviet 

In  August,    19^4,    the   Internal  Security 
Division  of  the  Department   of  Justice  gave  con- 
sideration to  action  that   could  be   taken  against 
individuals  named  by  Elizabeth  T.   Bentley  under 
Public  Law  600,    8jrd  Congress,    which   is  commonly 
known  as   the   Immunity  Act, 

On  September  1,   19S'^>  Sdward  Joseph 
Fitzgerald  appeared  before  a  Federal  Grand  Jury   in 
Camden,   New  Jersey,    and   invoked   the  Fifth  Amendment 
in  response  to  questions  relating  to   the  allegations 
of  Elizabeth  T.   Bentley.     He  again  claimed   the  Fifth 
Amendment  before  a  Federal  Grand  Jury   in  New  York  City 
on  July  20,   1955'      On  July  29,   1955,    he  was  offered 
immunity  and  again  claimed  privilege  urder  the  Fifth 
Amendment.      On  August  id,    1955»   Fitzgerald  was  found 
guilty  of  contempt    in  the  District  Court  for  the 
Southern  District   of  New  York  for  having   refused   to 
testify  after  having  been  granted   immunity  under  the 
procedures  set  forth  by  the  Immunity  Act.     He  was 
given  a  sentence  of  six  months  and  remanded   to 
custody   in     October,   195^,    to  serve   the  sentence 
after  refusing   to  purge  himself  of  the  contempt 

2.     The  Case  of  William  Ludwia  Ullmann 

Elizabeth  T.   Bentley,    in  November,   194-5, 
identified  William  Ludwig  Ullmann,    a  resident  at   the 
home  of  Nathan  Gregory  Silvermaster,    as   one   of   the 
individuals  who  was  furnishing   information  for  Soviet 
intelligence.      Ullmann  was  born   in  1908  at  Springfield, 
Missouri ,    and  entered   the  service  of  the  United  States 
Government    in  1935'     He  continued  service   in  a  civilian 
capacity  with   the  United  States  Government  until   1942 
uihen  he  was   inducted   into   the  armed  forces.      In  194-5 
he  was   released  from  active  duty  with  the   rank  of  major 
and  returned   to  civilian  service  with   the  United  States 
Government  until   he   resigned   in  early  194/'. 


According   to  Elizabeth  T.   Bentley,    Ullmann 
brought  Government  documents  containing  data  vMich, 
in  his  opinion,    would  be  of   interest    to   the  Soviets 
to    the  Silvermaster  home  for   transmittal    to  Bentley. 
He  provided  himself  with  a  camera  and  became  pro- 
ficient   in  document   photography.      Bentley  advised 
that   Ullmann,    while    in  the   armed  forces  of   the 
United  States,   furnished  data  on  aircraft  production, 
aircraft  allocation  and  deployment  and  pertinent 
developments  regarding   the  construction,    planning 
and  completion  of  a  strategic-type  of  American 

The   investigation  of  Ullmann  disclosed   that 
his  contacts    included  many  of  the   individuals  named 
by  Elizabeth  T.   Bentley  as  being    involved   in  Soviet 

In  August,   195"^ »    ^he   Internal   Security 
Division  of  the  Department   of  Justice  gave  consideration 
to   action  against   Ullmann  under  Public  Law  600, 
Eighty-Third  Congress,    which   is  commonly  referred 
to   as   the   Immunity  Act.      On  November  J,    iPS'^r 
William  Ludwig  Ullmann  appeared  before  a  Federal 
Grand  Jury  and   invoked  the  Fifth  Amendment    in  response 
to   questions   relating   to   the  allegations  of  Elizabeth  T. 
Bentley.      On  February  9>    1955t    on  order  was  granted 
directing  Ullmann  to  answer  questions  propounded  to 
him  before    the  Federal   Grand  Jury^      After  dismissal 
of  an  appeal   by  Ullmann,    he  again  appeared  before  a 
Federal   Grand  Jury  on  March  8,    1955s    orui  refused 
to  answer   questions  directed   to  him  after  being  granted 
immunity  under   the  Immunity  Act.      Contempt  proceedinps 
were   instituted  and  he   was  sentenced  on  March  8,    1955* 
to  a  term  of  six  months   in  prison,.     The  conviction  of 
Ullmann  was  upheld  by  the  Supreme  Court   of  the  United 
States  on  March  26,    1956. 

J.     The  Case  of  William   Walter  Remington 

Elizabeth  T.  Bentley  also    identified 
William   Walter  Remington,    an  employee   of  the   United 
States  Government,    as  one  of  the  sources  of   information 
in  the  Government   service   through  which  she  obtained 
information  for  the  Soviets.      Remington  was   born 

-  23 

October  2^,   1917,    in  New  York  City  and  entered  the 
Government   service    in  193^'      ^^   "^^  employed 
intermittently  by   the  Government  from   that  date 
until   19$0. 

Remington,    according   to  Elizabeth  To 
Bentley,    was    introduced   to  her  by  Jacob  Golos,    a 
Soviet   espionage  agent   who  was  one   of  Bentley' s 
Soviet   espionage  superiors    in  the   early  part   of 
1942.      During   the  following   two   years  she  met 
Remington  by  pre  arrangements   on  approximately 
fifteen  occasions,    at   which  times  she  obtained  from 
him    information  from   the  files   of   the  War-  Production 
Board.      Bentley  collected  Communist  Party  dues  during 
this  period  from  both  Remington  and  his   wife. 
Remington's   relationship  with  Bentley  ceased    in  1944 
when  Remington  joined   the  United  States  Navy.      The 
activities   of  Remington  as    they    involved  his 
association  with  Bentley  were   verified  by  Remington's 
former  wife. 

On  January  2?,    1953,    William   Walter 
Remington  was  convicted  of  perjury  on   two   counts  and 
was  sentenced   to  a   term   in  Lewisburg  Penitentiary, 
Lewisburg,    Pennsylvania,    after   the  Supreme  Court 
of  the  United  States   refused   to   review  his  conviction. 
Remington  died  on  November  24,    195^,    at  Lewisburg 

b.      The  Testimony  of  Whittaher  Chambers 

Earlier  Soviet-directed  espionage  which 
successfully  obtained  unauthorized  and   vital    information 
from  our  Government  departments,    as   early  as    the  193^'^, 
was   revealed  by  Whittaker  Chambers,    a  confessed  Soviet 

Joining    the  Communist  Party   in  1924,    Chambers 
later  became  active    in  the  Party  underground    in  New  York 
City.      In  1935  ^is  Soviet   superior,   J.    Peters,    sent   him 
to   Washington,   B.    C,    to  look    into    the  background  and 
activities  of  another  underground  organization,    or 
apparatus,   located   there,   headed  by  Harold  Ware,    and 
made  up  of  Government   employees.      Peters    told  Chambers 
to  find  out   which  members   of  this  group  could  keep   the 
Party  well    informed  on  current  activities  within  their 

24   - 

respective  Government  departments  or  agencies.     For 
a  while  Chambers  acted  as  a  morale  officer  and  liaison 
man  between  this  group  and  J.    Peters    in  New  York.      In 
late  1936   this  apparatus   was   taken  over  by  a 
Colonel  Bykov,    another  Soviet   agent,    in  New  York. 

Its  operations  were  focused   in  Washington, 
Baltimore  and  New  York.      From  193^   to   early  193° 
Chambers   received  from  certain  members   of  this  apparatus 
important  Government  documents  for   transmittal    to  his 
Russian  superiors.      Among   those   who   contributed  were 
Alger  Hiss,    a  State  Department   employee,    and  Franklin 
Reno   who  was  employed  at    the  Aberdeen  Proving  Ground, 
Aberdeen,  Maryland.      Documents   would   be   extracted 
from  Government  files,    photographed  or  typed  and   then 
returned  without  delay.      Apartments  were  made  available 
in  Washington  and  Baltimore  for  photographic  purposes 
and  Party  members  schooled    in  photography  did   the  work. 
Chambers  was   the  courier  and  sometimes  photographed   the 
documents  himself.     The  Soviets  were  constantly  supplied 
with  current    information  of  value   to   our  Government. 

1 .      The  Case  of  Alaer  Hiss 

Chambers'  chief  unauthorized  source  of 
information  was  Alger  Hiss,    who  for  many  years 
advanced  himself  within  the  State  Department  until 
he  finally  became  Director  of  the   Office  of  Special 
Political  Affairs   responsible  for  United  Nations 
matters.     He  was  one  of  the  late  President  Roosevelt's 
advisors  at   the  Yalta  Conference,    and  was  Secretary- 
General   of  the  San  Francisco  Conference  which  organ- 
ized  the  United  Nations   Organization   in  194$. 

According    to   Whittaker  Chambers,    all 
materials   received  by  him  from  apparatus  members, 
except  Alger  Hiss,    were  original   Government  docu- 
ments.     At  first.   Hiss  furnished  Chambers  original 
documents,    but  later  gave  him   typewritten  excerpts 
and  summaries  of  State  Department  documents   to   help 
speed  up  operations. 


Although  Hiss  has  continually  denied  his 
implication  in  Soviet   espionage ,   he  was   tried  and 
convicted   in  IS^g-ig^O  on  perjury  charges  growing 
out   of  Chambers'   allegations  of  espionage  and  was 
sentenced   to  a  five-year  term   in  a  Federal 

In  perjur  ing    himself  before  a  Federal 
Grand  Jury   in  19^8  he  denied   that  he  had  ever 
furnished  Chambers  any  documents  or  copies  of 
documents  from   the  State  Department.      He  also  denied 
he  had  ever  seen  Chambers  within  the  period   that 
Chambers  alleged  he  performed   these  espionage 

2.      The  Case  of  Franklin  Victor  Reno 

In  1937  Reno  was  employed  at   the  Aberdeen 
Proving  Ground,   Aberdeen,  Maryland,    and   in  the  same 
year  was   introduced   to  Whittaker  Chambers   through  a 
mutual   Communist  Party  underground  worker.      He 
immediately  fulfilled  espionage  assignments  given 
him  by  turning  over  to  Chambers  on  various  occasions 
such  vital    information  as   the   textbook  qf  the 
Ordnance  School  which  dealt  with  ballistics,   and 
mathematical  data  about  firing   tables  of  certain 
guns,    among  other  things. 

Reno  not   only  committed  espionage  but  his 
failure   to   tell    the   truth  finally  fourid  him  serving 
a   three-year   term   in  a  Federal   penitentiary  for 
falsifying    information  concerning  his  former  Communist 
Party  membership.      This  he  concealed  when  filling 
out  a  personnel   history  questionnaire  at  Aberdeen 
in  1948. 

A  Federal   Grand  Jury   indictment    in  1951 
charged  him  with  making  false  statements   to   the  Army 
on  a  personnel   history  statement  and   in  195^  ^s  was 
sentenced  as  previously   indicated. 

-  26  - 

B.  Judith  Covlon  -  Valentine  A.    Gubitchev  Case 

Judith  Coplon,    born   in  Brooklyn   in  1921,    obtained 
employment    in  194J    in   the  Department   of  Justice,    New  York 
City.      In  194^,    at   her  request,    she  was    transferred   to 
Washington,    D.    C,    where  she  was   employed   in  the  Foreign 
Agents  Registration  Section  of  the  Department   of  Justice. 

Coplon  was  observed  clandestinely  meeting  with 
Valentine  A.    Gubitchev,    a  Soviet  citizen  employed  as  an 
engineer  by   the  United  Nations  Secretariat    in  New  York  City. 
After  a  clandestine  meeting   on  March  4,    194-9,    in  New  York, 
both     were   arrested  by   the  FBI.      In  her  purse  at    the    time 
of  her  arrest  Coplon  carried  summaries   of  confidential 
FBI  reports   to  which  she  had  access    in  her  employment. 

Coplon  was   tried    in  Washington,    D.    C,   for 
espionage  and  on  July  1,   19^9,    ^jxls   sentenced  to   ten  years 
in  prison. 

Gubitchev  and  Coplon  were    tried   in  New  York  City 
for  conspiring   to  commit   espionage  and  were  convicted.      On 
March  9j    ^9^0,   she  was  sentenced   to  fifteen  years    in  prison. 
On  the  same  date,   Gubitchev  was  also  sentenced   to  fifteen 
years   in  prison;   however,    his  sentence  was  suspended  with   the 
provision  that  he  depart  from   the  United  States  and  not   return. 

Although  Coplon' s  conviction   in  New  York  was 
reversed  and  she  was  held  entitled  to  a  new  trial    in 
Washington,   D.    C,    based  en   technical   grounds    in  both 
instances,    it    is   interesting   to  note   that  Judge  Learned  Hand, 
Second  Circuit,    Court   of  Appeals,   made  a  statement    that    even 
though  the  case  was  being   reversed,    the  guilt   of  Coplon  was 

C.  Fuchs   -  Gold  ~  Rosenberg     °°  Atomic  Espionage  Conspiracu 

1.      Harry  Gold 

The  FClaus  Fuchs  =  Harry  Gold  treachery  has 
become    inseparable  from   the  history  of  the  atomic  age. 
Fuchs,    a  German-born  physicist,    loas  forced   to  flee 
Germany   in  1933-      He   went    to  England  where  he   became 
a  naturalized  citizen  and  was   trusted  with   the  most 
vital    secrets   of  that   country.      In  May,    1941,   Fuchs 

-  27 

57425    O  -  60  -  5 

was  placed  on  research  work  on  atomic   energy  and 
almost    immediately  he   rewarded  his  benefactors  by 
seeking  out  Soviet  agents   to  whom  he  could  and  did 
give   important    information  in  his  possession.      In 
December,    194J,    he  came   to   the  United  States  as  a 
member  of  the  select  British  mission  to  carry  on 
further  atomic   research   in  coordination  with  the 
Americans.     Before  leaving  England,   Fuchs  had  already 
perfected  arrangements   to  continue  his  espionage 
activities   in  the  United  States.      These  arrangements 
resulted   in  placing  Fuchs   in  touch  with  Harry  Gold, 
who    in  turn  was   in  contact  with  Anatoli  Antonovich 
Yakovlev,   an  official   of  the  Soviet  Consulate   in 
New  York  City.      From   early  19'^   through  September, 
194$,   Fuchs  worked  with   the  Manhattan  Engineer 
District    in  New  York  and   in  Los  Alamos  and  furnished 
his   information  to  Gold  who  relayed   it   to  Yakovlev. 
Fuchs   returned  to  England   in  June,   194-6,    when  plans 
had  already  been  made  for  his  future  activity  in 
England  which  lasted  until   1949- 

On  January  27,    1950,    after  the  FBI  had 
informed  the  British   that  Fuchs  loas  a  Soviet   spy, 
Fuchs  confessed  his  activities  on  behalf  of  Soviet 
Russia.      Concerning  his  American  contact,   all  Fuchs 
was  able   to  furnish  was  a  meager  physical  description 
and  the  belief  that   this  man  was  not  a  nuclear  phycist 
but  a  person  with  some   knowledge  of  chemistry  and 
engineering.      Within  four  months   this  contact  was 
identified  as  Harry  Gcldo 

The   search  for  Harry  Gold   ended   on  May  22, 
1950,    when  he   was  confronted  with  his  possession  of 
a   travel  folder  and  map  concerning  Santa  Fe,    New  Mexico, 
after  having  previously  claimed    that   he   had  never  been 
west   of  the  Mississippi  River.      Gold,    born   in 
Switzerland    in  I9IO,    had  been  brought    to   the   United 
States  by  his  Russian-born  parents    in  1914  and  he 
became  a  citizen  through   the   naturalization  of  his 
father.      Gold  admitted  espionage  activity  on  behalf 
of  Russia  since  1935  o.nd  made   available   valuable 
infoTTnation  concerning  his  activities  ar.d   those 
involved  with  him. 

-  28 

On  December  9,   19^0,   Harry  Gold,    after 
entering  a  plea  of  guilty,    was  sentenced   to   thirty 
years   in  prison  and  he   is  presently  confined   in  the 
Federal   penitentiary  at  Lewisburg,    Pennsylvania. 

2.      David  Greenalass 

In  May,    19-^Sr   Harry  Gold  was  given  an 
assignment   by  Yakovlev   to   go    to  Santa  Fe,    New  Mexico, 
to  accept   a  delivery  of  vital    atomic   energy   information 
from  Fuchs.      In  connection  with   this   trip,    Yakovlev 
gave  Gold  another   task;   namely,    to  contact   an  American 
soldier   in  Albuquerque,   New  Mexico,    to   obtain  from 
him    information  on   the  atomic   bomb.      On  a  Sunday 
morning   in  early  June,   19'^^t   G^old  did  contact   the 
American  soldier  at    the  soldier's  home    in  Albuquerque 
and  delivered  to  him  an  envelope  containing  &500,      In 
turn,    the  soldier  delivered   to  Gold  written   information 
regarding   experiments   being  conducted    in  relation  to 
the  atomic   bomb.      The   two  men  never  saw  each  other 
again  and  Gold  could  not   recall   the    identity  of  the 
soldier.     Based  upon  Gold's  facts,    an  FBI  investigation 
Jed   to   the    identification   of  David  Greenglass  as   the 
American  soldier   involved.     The    investigation  of  Greenglass 
led   to   the  uncovering  of  the  Soviet   espionage  network 
headed  by  Julius  Rosenberg. 

The  most    interesting  development    in  connection 
with   the  above  lies    in  the  fact    that    the  Soviets  disregarded 
one  of  their  cardinal   rules  prohibiting  contacts  between 
members   of  separate  espionage  networks    in  using  Gold   to 
contact  Greenglass.      This  error  cost   them  an  espionage 
network  and   their  error  was   realized  by   them  prior   to 
the  arrest   of  Greenglass  as  Rosenberg,    the  head  of  the 
network,    when  he  learned  of  the  arrest   of  Gold,    gave 
Greenglass  and  his  wife  ^^,000  and   instructions   to  go 
to  Mexico  where  arrangements   would  be  made  for  false 
passports  with  xahich   they  could   travel    to  Czechoslovakia. 

Greenglass,    born   in  New  York  City   in  1922, 
was  a  machinist  who  served   in  the  United  States  Army 
from  1943   to  19^6.     He  was  stationed  at  Los  Alamos 
from  August,    19'^t    to  February,    194-6. 


Greenglass  did  not  leave   the  country  as 
instructed  by  Rosenberg  and  was  arrested   in  June, 
1950,    in  New  York  City.     He  confessed  his  espionage 
activities  and  was   indicted  on  a  charge  of  conspiracy 
to  commit   espionage.     He  entered  a  plea  of  guilty  and 
after  testifying  as  a  Government  witness  against  Julius 
and  Ethel  Rosenberg  and  Morton  Sobell,    he  was  sentenced 
to  a  term  of  imprisonment  for  fifteen  years. 

J.      Julius  and  Ethel  Rosenberg 

The   questioning  of  David  Greenglass  and  his 
wife,   Ruth,    resulted    in  their  admissions  of  espionage 
activity  carried  on  at    the    instigation  and  under  the 
direction  of  Julius  Rosenberg,   husband  of  David's 
sister,   Ethel,  for  the  purpose  of  aiding   the  Soviet 
Union.     Julius  Rosenberg,   assisted  by  his  wife,    was 
able  to  persuade  Ruth  Greenglass   to   induce  her  husband 
in  Los  Alamos   in  19^4   to  make  available  secret  data 
concerning  atomic   energy  research  which  was  available 
to  him    in  his  position.      Subsequently,    Greenglass 
furnished  valuable  and  secret    information  both  to 
Harry  Gold  and   to  Rosenberg  concerning   the  developments 
at  Los  Alamos. 

In  addition  to   the  atomic   energy   information, 
Rosenberg  had   other  espionage  objectives.     Max  Elitcher, 
an  employee  of  the  Bureau  of  Ordnance,   Navy  Department, 
from  193°  ^°  19'^d,    stated  Rosenberg,    on  approximately 
nine  occasions,    attempted  to  persuade  him   tc   turn  over 
material   and  drawings  handled  by  Elitcher   in  his  work. 
Greenglass   told   of  Rosenberg 's  boast    to  him   that  he 
once   took   the  entire  proximity  fuse  out   of  a  New  York 
City  plant  where  he  was  stationed  as  a  Government 
inspector.     Rosenberg  also   told  Greenglass  he  had 
learned  of  a   "sky  platform"  on  which   the  United  States 
Government   was   working.      He   said   the    idea  was   to  create 
a  platform  at  a  point    in  space  where  gravity  ceased 
to  exist,   perhaps  $,000  miles  above   the  earth. 

Julius  Rosenberg  was  arrested  July  17,   1950, 
and  his  wife  was  arrested  August  11,    195^,    and  both 
were  charged  with  conspiracy  to  commit   espionage.      The 
trial   of  the  Rosenbergs  and  Morton  Sobell   was  held   in 
March,    1951 1    a^  which   time   they  were  found  guilty.      The 
Rosenbergs  were  sentenced   to  death   in  April,    1951>    ci^ 
were   executed  on  June  IQ,    1953' 

-  30   - 

Between   the    time  of  the  sentence   and   the 
execution   the  Rosenberg  case,    in  one  form   or  another, 
loas  before  the  United  States  District   Court   on  sixteen 
occasions,    before   the  United  States  Circuit   Court   of 
Appeals  on  nine   occasions,    before   the  United  States 
Supreme  Court   on  nine   occasions  and   there  were   two 
applications  for  executive  clemency. 

4.     Morton  Sobell 

The  espionage  activities  of  Morton  Sobell 
rose  as   a   result   of  disclosures  made   by  Max  Elitcher 
concerning   the  Rosenberg  network.      He  advised   that 
when  he  was  approached  by  Rosenberg,    a  former  college 
classmate,    and   requested   to   obtain   information  for 
transmittal    to  Russia,   Rosenberg   told  him   that  Sobell 
was   either  working  or  cooperating   with  him    in  his 
activities.      Later,    Elitcher  repeated   this  statement 
to  Sobell    which  caused  Sobell    to   become   quite  angry 
and   to   remark   that  Rosenberg  should  not   have  mentioned 
his  name.      Further,    after  Sobell  moved   to  New  York  City 
in  1946  or  19^7 i    ^e  was   instrumental    in  arranging 
further  meetings  between  Rosenberg  and  Elitcher  and, 
in  doing  so,    indicated  his  knowledge   of  the  fact   that 
Rosenberg  wanted   to  discuss  with  Elitcher  the  matter 
of  his  furnishing    information   to    the  RussiaTis.      Also, 
in  July,    19^,   Elitcher  accompanied  Sobell    in  his  car 
on  a   trip   to    the  lower  east   side   of  New  York    in  the 
vicinity  of  the  Rosenberg  apartment.      Sobell   left 
Elitcher   in  the  car  for  approximately  fifteen  minutes 
and  on  his   return   indicated  he  had  delivered  a   'can' 
to  Rosenberg,    and  Sobell   described   its  contents  as 
'good  material.' 

An   investigation  was   instituted  and  showed 
that  Morton  Sobell   had  failed   to   return  to   his  place 
of  employment   after  June  16,    1950,    the  day  of  the  arrest 
of  David  Greenglass.      It   was  determined  Sobell   and  his 
family  left  New  York  City  by  airplane   on  June  23,    1950, 
and  proceeded   to  Mexico  City.      While    in  Mexico,    the 
Sobell  family  lived  under  assumed  names  and  corresponded 
with   their  relatives    in  the  United  States   through  a  mail 
drop.      Sobell   was  arrested   in  Mexico  City  by  Mexican 
security  police  and  was   turned  over   to   the  FBI  at  Laredo, 
Texas,      He  was   indicted  and   tried  with   the  Rosenbergs, 
On  April  5$    1951>    ^e  ^^^s   sentenced   to  a    term   of  thirty 
years.      He  participated    in   the  Rosenbergs'  appeals  and 
since   their  execution  appealed  his  case   to   the  Supreme 
Court    twice  with  negative   results, 

-  31    - 

f.      William  Perl 

William  Perl,    bom    in  New  York   City   in  I918,    was 
a  classmate  of  both  Julius  Rosenberg  and  Morton  Sobell  at 
college.     He  worked  for  the  National  Advisory  Committee  for 
Aeronautics  at  Langley  Field,    Virginia,   and  Cleveland,    Ohio, 
after  his  graduation.      It  was  learned   that  Sobell  maintained 
close   touch  with  Perl    through  correspondence  after  their 
graduation  from  college. 

Perl  admitted   that    in  July,    19$0,   a  girl  he 
recognized   to  be  a  former  girl  friend  of  a  close  friend  of 
his   visited  him   in  Cleveland.     He  said   that   she   explained   in 
writing   that  a  stranger   instructed  her  to  proceed  from  New  York 
City  to  Cleveland   to  deliver  a  message   to  an  aeronautical 
engineer.      She  wrote  out   the    instructions  for  him   to  leave   the 
United  States  and  flee   to  Mexico.      She  mentioned  the  name 
"Rosenberg."     This  girl   was  located  and  on   interview  verified 
the  above    information  and  stated   that  Perl   refused  to  accept 
the  sum  of  ^2,000  which  she  offered   to  him. 

Perl  was  called   to   testify  before  a  Federal   Grand 
Jury  and  denied  that  he  had  been  acquainted  and  associated 
with  Julius  Rosenberg  and  Morton  Sobell,     He  loas  found  guilty 
on   two  counts  of  perjury  concerning  his  denial   of  knowledge  of 
Rosenberg  and  Sobell.      On  June  S>    ^9S3>    'i*  w*®  sentenced   to 
serve  five  years  on  each  count   to   run  concurrently, 

6.     Alfred  Dean  Slack 

Harry  Gold  voas   thoroughly   interviewed  for   information 
about  his  espionage  associates  and  contacts.     He   told  of  his 
first  meeting  Alfred  Dean  Slack  on   the    instructions  of  his   then 
Russian  superior   in  September,    19^0.      In  meetings  occurring 
between  1940  and  19^2,   Slack  furnished   information  from   the 
files  of  Eastman  Kodak  and  concerning   the  making  of  nylon.     Fate 
came   to   the  assistance  of  Gold  and  his  Soviet  network  when   in 
September,    19^-2,    Slack  was   transferred   to  the  Holston  Ordnance 
Works,  Kingsport,   Tennessee,      In  about  April,    194A,   Slack 
turned  over  to  Harry  Gold   the  formula  for  and  a  sample  of  RDX, 
a  secret  and  powerful  explosive   being  manufactured  at   the 
Holston  Works. 

Slack  was  bom    in  Syracuse,   New  York,   August  6, 
190^,    of  American-bom  parents.      When   interviewed   in  June,    1950, 
he   related  his  original   recruitment  by  his  brother-in-law, 
Richard  Briggs,   a   research  chemist,   and  his  furnishing   information 

-  32  - 

to   the  Soviets   through  Briggs  shortly  after  193^-     ^^  first 
he   believed  the    information  loas  used  by  Briggs  for  business 
purposes;   however,    later  Briggs   told  Slack   that  he  was  passing 
the    information  on   to   the  Russians,    specifically  one    "George." 
Slack   later  met   George  and  on   the  death  of  Briggs    in   1939 >    ^« 
continued   supplying    information   to   George,    who   was    identified 
by  Slack  as  Gaik  Ovakimian,    a  Russian  arrested   in  New  York  City 
in  May,    1941,   for  violation  of  the  Registration  Act.      Ovakimian 
was  allowed   to   leave   the  United  States   in  July,    1941.      Slack 
admitted  his  contacts  with  Gold  and   the  handing  over  to  Gold  of 
the  formula  and  sample   of  RDX,    a  military  explosive. 

After  pleading  guilty  to  a  charge  of  conspiracy  to 
commit  espionage.  Slack  was  sentenced  in  September,  1950,  to 
serve  fifteen  years   in  a  Federal   penitentiary. 

7.  Abraham  Brothman 

8.  Miriam  Moskowitz 

Abraham  Brothman  first   came   to   the  attention  of  the 
FBI  when,    as  a   result   of  the  disclosures   of  Elizabeth  Bentley, 
it  was  learned   that   in  1940  she  had  been    introduced   to 
Brothman  by  Jacob  Golos.      Thereafter,    she   contacted  Brothman 
on  about   ten  occasions   receiving  from  him   various  blueprints 
and  documents  for  delivery   to  Golos.      She   last   contacted  him   in 
late   1940  and  gave  him  specific    instructions  on  meeting  his  new 
Soviet  contact  whose    identity  she  did  not  know. 

Harry  Gold,   after  his  arrest,   admitted   that  under 
the    instructions  of  Semen  Semenov,    his  Soviet  superior,    he 
contacted  Brothman    in  New  York   City   in  September,    1941.     He 
stated   thereafter  he   obtained  blueprints,    documents  and  other 
information  of  a  commercial,    industrial   nature  for  transmission 
to   the  Soviets. 

On   interview  in  May,    1947,   Brothman  furnished   to   the 
FBI  fabricated   information   to   the   effect   that  he  met  Gold   through 
Jacob  Golos,    then  deceased.      Immediately  following   the    interview, 
he  furnished  Gold   the  substance  of  the  statements  he  made  and 
requested  Gold   to  use  a  similar  story.     Brothman   testified  along 
the  same  line   before  a  Federal   Grand  Jury   in  July,    1947,   and 
when  Gold  later  received  a  subpoena   to   testify  before   the  same 
Grand  Jury,   Brothman  spent   two  hours  reviewing  with  Gold   the 
details  of  his   testimony  to  assure   that   their  stories  would 
coincide.      Brothman  and  his   business  partner,   Miriam  Moskowitz, 
loere   indicted  on  a  charge   of  conspiracy  to   obstruct  and   impede 

-  33  - 

the  administration  of  justice.      Both  were  convicted.     Brothman 
was  sentenced   to   two  years    imprisonment  and  $10,000  fine   on  one 
count  and  five   years  and  ^^,000  on   the   second  count.      Moshowitz 
received  a  sentence  of  two   years  and  ^10,000  fine.      On  appeal 
the   Circuit    Court   of  Appeals   reversed  Brothman' s  conviction  on 
the   count   carrying   the  five   year  sentence   on   the  grounds    that 
venue  did  not  lie    in   the  Southern  District  of  New  York.      The 
conviction  of  Moshowitz  was  upheld. 

9.  Anatoli  Antonovich   Yahovlev 

Yakovlev  entered   the   United  States    in  February,    19"^!, 
and  assumed  his  duties  as  a   clerk  at    the   Soviet   Consulate    in 
New  York  City.      From   the  first   part   of  1944   through  late   19^5 
he  directed   the  activities  of  Harry  Gold  and   received  from  him 
all    the  atomic   energy    information   turned  over  by  Fuchs    in   the 
United  States.      It    is    interesting   to  note    that    in  July,    19'^^> 
upon  his   return  from  a    two-month   trip   to  Moscow,    he   was  made 
vice   consul   of  the   Soviet    Consulate    in  New  York   City.      He   left 
the   United  States    in  December,    1946.     He   was  named  as  a 
coconspirator  and  codefendant    in   the  Rosenberg-Sobell    indictment; 
however,    he  has  not   returned   to   the  United  States  and  has  not 
been   tried. 

10.  Semen  Markovich  Semenov 

Semenov  was   the  espionage  superior  of  Harry  Gold 
during   the  period  from  1940  through  19-^3-     ^^  first   entered   the 
United  States    in   193^  ^^'^  attended  Massachusetts   Institute   of 
Technology  where  he   obtained  a  masters  degree    in  science    in  1940. 
In  July,    1941,    he   was  designated  as  an  official    of  Amtorg 
Trading   Corporation,   New  York   City.     He   left   the   United  States   in 
September,    1944. 

.34   - 

S,      Clarence  Houard  Vetterli   Case 

Igor  Gouzenko,    Code  Clerk  for  the  Soviet  Military 
Attache,    Ottawa,    Canada,   from  the   summer  of    19^3  until    his 
defection  to   Canadian  authorities   in  September,    19^5>    revealed 
that    in  August,    194$,   Moscow  had   instructed   the  Soviet 
Military  Attache   in  Ottawa   to  obtain  a  Canadian  passport 
for  a  Soviet  agent   then  residing   in  Los  Angeles,   California, 
under  the  name  Ignacy  Samuel   Witczak.      Gouzenko   stated   that 
Witczak's  function   in  this  country  was  to  operate  a  netvoork 
of  Soviet  agents   in  the  event   Soviet  diplomatic   establishments 
were  no  longer  available     due  to  a   break   in  United  States  - 
Soviet  diplomatic   relations. 

The   true   identity  of  Soviet  agent  Witczak  has 
never  been  established.     He  used   the  passport  and  assumed 
the   identity  of  a  naturalized  Canadian  of  the  same  name 
who   had  been  born   in  Poland.     The  real   Witczak  had  served 
with  the  Loyalists   in  Spain  during   the  Spanish  Civil   War. 
He  alleged   that  his  Canadian  passport   had  been  taken  from 
him  upon  his  arrival    in  Spain  and  that    it   lojs  subsequently 
reported   to   have  been  destroyed. 

The  Soviet  agent  Witczak  entered   the  United  States 
in    1933  and  studied  at   the  University  of  Southern  California. 
In    1945  ^e  "OS  Assistant  Professor   in  the  Political   Science 
Department  at   that  University.      On  November  21,    1945,    he 

Investigation  established  that  Soviet  agent  Witczak's 
most    intimate  associate   in  the  United  States  was  Clarence  Howard 
Vetterli   who  appeared  to   be  cognizant  of  Witczak' s  activities. 
Vetterli   was  used  by  Witczak  for   the  purpose  of  contacting 
various   individuals.      On  May  25,    194-9,    Vetterli   was  brought 
before  a  Federal   Grand  Jury   in  Los  Angeles,   and  denied  any 
part    in  Witczak' s   intelligence  activities.     Based  on  his 
denials  he  was  indicted  and  convicted  on  two   counts  of  perjury 
and  sentenced  to    si:x  years   imprisonment  on  July  25,    195^'     -^'s 
conviction  was  affirmed  by  the  United  States  Court  of  Appeals, 

On  November    10,    1952,    the  United  States  Supreme 
Court   vacated  the  judgment  of  the  Court  of  Appeals  and 
remanded   the  case  fo   the  United  States  District   Court  for 
resentencing  of  Vetterli.     He  was  resentenced  on  February  2, 
1953>    io  a   total   of  si-x  years  to   be   reduced  by  the  time 
already  served   in  custody  of  the  Attorney  General. 

-35  - 

D>      Otto   Verber  -  Kurt  Ponger  Case 

Otto  Verber  and  Kurt  Ponger,    his   brother-in-law, 
were  naturalized  American  citizens  and  were  members  of  the 
United  States  Armed  Forces  during  World  War  II.      Upon 
their  discharge  from  the  Army  after  World  War  II  they 
remained    in   Germany  and  accepted  civilian  employment    in 
connection  with  the  Nuremburg  War  Crimes  Trials,      They 
were  recruited  by  the  Soviets   to  act    in  an  espionage 
capacity  against    the   United  States  Army  establishment 
in  Vienna,   Austria,   and  were    instructed   to  secure    infor- 
mation concerning  United  States    installations  and 
personalities.      They  recruited  an  American   employee   of  the 
United  States  Air  -Force    in  Vienna  who  was   operated  as  a 
double  agent  against   the  Soviets   by  the   United  States  Army, 

The  double  agent   returned   to    the   IMited  States 
and  as  a  result   of   instructions  from  Ponger  and  Verber  he 
was  placed   in  contact  with  Yuri  Novikov,   Second  Secretary 
of  the  Soviet  Embassy,    Washington,   D,   C,     Novikov  met  with 
the  double  agent   on   ten  different   occasions    in  Washington, 
Do    C,    or   the    immediate   vicinity.      The  last  meeting   took 
place   on  April   22,    19^2,     At  some   of  these  meetings  Novikov 
accepted   information  from  the  double  agent,    some   of  which 
was   of  a  classified  nature^     Novikov  showed  a  definite 
and  particular   interest    in   the  sources   of   information 
utilized  by  the    intelligence  agencies  of  the  United  States 
Military  establ  ishment.     He  also    indicated  a  desire  for 
data  concerning   the   operations  of  the   United  States  Armed 
Forces   in  Europe  and  data  possessed  by  the  Air  Force 
relative   to   vital    installations  such  as    railroad,    air 
fields,    heavy   industry,    etc,    in   the  Soviet  Union,     He  also 
expressed   interest    in   information  concerning   the    intelligence 
set-up  of   the  North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization   (NATO), 
On  January  14,   19S3>    ^^^   United  States  State  Department 
declared  Yuri  Novikov  persona  non  grata  for  his  activities 
in   this  case  and  Novikov  departed  for  the  Soviet   Union 
on  January  19,   1953' 

Verber  and  Ponger,    the   original   principals   in 
this  operation,    were   brought   back   to   the   United  States  and 
pleaded  guilty   to   espionage  charges.      On  June  8,    1953* 
Verber  was  sentenced   to  a   term  of  not  less   than   three   years, 
four  months   or  more   than   ten  years  and  Ponger  was  sentenced 
to  a   term  of  not  less   than  five  years   or  more   than  fifteen 

-  J6  - 

F.     Jack  Soble  Case 

In  the  early    19^0' s  the  FBI  was  conducting  an 
intensive   investigation   into   the  activities  of  Vassili 
Zubilin    (true  name,    Vassili  Mikhailovich  Zarubin) ,    Third 
Secretary  of  the  Soviet  Embassy,    Washington,   D.    C,      Zubilin 
had  entered  the  United  States  on  December  25,    1941,    with 
his  wife,   Elizabeth,   and  son,   Peter.      The   investigation 
disclosed   that  Zubilin  had  been  an   important  Soviet    intelli- 
gence agent  for  many  years.     During    1934-1937  he  was   in  the 
United  States  on  several   occasions  utilizing  an  American 
passport  fraudulently  obtained  under   the  name  of  Edward  Joseph 

The  first   break  in  the  FBI  investigation  came  when 
in  the  Spring  of   1943r    Zubilin,    while  under  physical 
surveillance  by  the  FBI,    was  observed  to   contact  Boris  Michael 
Ikirros,   a  motion-picture  producer   in  Hollywood.     After 
extensive   investigation   into   the  activities  of  Miorros,    he 
was  interviewed  by  the  FBI   in  July,    1947,    and  admitted  he 
was  recruited  by  Zubilin  for  Soviet    intelligence  activities. 
Morros,    thereafter,   agreed  to  operate  as  a  double  agent 
against   the  Soviets  under   the  direction  of  the  FBI.     Thus 
began  an  operation  of  intrigue  which  led   to   the  expose  of  a 
Soviet   espionage   ring    in  New  York  City  culminated  by  the 
arrest  on  January  25,    1957 1    ^y  ^^  Agents  of  Jack  Soble, 
Myra  Soble  and  Jacob  Albam  on  charges  of  conspiring  to 
commit   espionage.      In  addition,    the  FBI   investigation 
resulted   in   identifying  as  Soviet    intelligence  agents,    Jane 
and  George  Zlatovski ,    who   were   indicted  on  July  a,    1957r 
charged  with  espionage  conspiracy;  Alfred  and  Mirtha  Stern, 
who   were   indicted  on  September  9,    1957*    on  two   counts 
charging   espionage  conspiracy;   Ilya  Wolston,    who   was 
charged  with  contempt  for  failing   to  appear  before  a  grand 
jury  and  on  August  7>    195^>  pleaded  guilty   in  the  Southern 
District  of  New  York;  ISark  Zborowski,    who   was  indicted  for 
perjury  on  April    l8,    195^>   <^s  a   result  of  his  denial   before 
the  Federal   Grand  Jury  that  he  knew  Jack  Soble;  and   Vassili 
liolev,   an  official   attached  to   the  Soviet  Embassy,   Washington, 
D.    C,    who   was  declared  persona  non  grata,   January  25,    1957' 

1 ,      Jack  and  M/ra  Soble 

Jack  Soble   entered  the  United  States  in    1941  as 
a  Lithuanian  refugee  and   in    1947  became  a  United  States 
citizen  by  naturalization.     As  early  as   1944  Soble 

-  37  ' 

participated  with  other  Soviet  agents  in  the  operation 
of  a   business  concern  organised  to   serve  as  a    "cover" 
for  Soviet  agents.     This  was  the  Boris  Morros  i&isic 
Company  with  offices   in  New  York  and  Los  Angeles.      In 
December,    1943>    Vassili   Zubilin   introduced  Morros  to 
Alfred  K.    Stern  and  his  wife,   Mirtha  Dodd  Stern,   at 
which  time   it   was  agreed  Stern  would   invest  $130,000 
in  Morros'   business,    becoming  an  officer,   and  learn  the 
business.      This  arrangement   was  consummated   in  early 
1944.      Shortly  after  the  agreement  was  made  between  the 
Sterns  and  Morros,    Zubilin  advised  Morros  that   he  was 
leaving   the  United  States  and   introduced  Morros  to 
Jack  Soble,   a   resident  of  New  York  City.      Zubilin 
instructed  that  Soble  was  thereafter   to  act  as  Morros' 
and  Stern's  superior. 

Soble  supervised  activities  of  Soviet  agents 
both   in  the  United  States  and  Hurope;  assigned  them  to 
recruit  U,   S.    Government   employees  stationed  abroad, 
to   obtain   information  concerning  military  equipment 
and  supplies;  and  has  claimed   to   have  obtained   infor- 
mation concerning   the  number  of  atomic   bombs  stockpiled 
in  the  United  States  and  the  rate  of  atomic   bomb  production 
as  well   as  photographs  of  atomic    "bunkers"   in  which  bombs 
were  stored. 

His  wife,   Myra   Soble,   also  a  Lithuanian  refugee, 
assisted  him  in  his  espionage  operations. 

Jack  and  Myra  Soble  were  arrested  by  FBI  Agents 
on  January  2$,    1957*   <^^  were   indicted  on  February  4,    1957* 
on  five  counts  charging  espionage,   conspiracy  and  violation 
of  the  Registration  Acts.     On  April    10,    1957>    they  pleaded 
guilty  to  count   two  of  the   indictment  which  charaed 
violation  of  Section  793t   Title    id,   U.   S.    Code   (commonly 
referred  to  as  the  peace-time  e:spionage  Statute)  which 
carriea  a  maximum  prison  sentence  of  ten  years.      On 
August   9t    1957>  Myra  Soble  was  sentenced  to  five  and 
one-half  years   in  Federal  prison  and  the  other  counts 
of  the   indictment  were  dismissed  as  to  her.     On  October  8, 
^957i   Jack  Soble  was  sentenced  to   seven  years  imprisonment. 
At   that   time  Myra  Soble' s  sentence  voas  reduced  to  four 
years.     The  other  counts  of  the   indictment  were  dismissed. 

.38  - 

2.      Jacob  Alham 

Jacob  Albam,   associated  with  the  Sobles   in 
the   espionage  conspiracy,    is  also  a  native  of  Lithuania, 
His  application  for  U.    S.   citizenship   in    1951  ^s  "o* 
been  granted.      Jacob  Albam  first  came  to   the  United 
States   in    19^7  on  a   visitor ' s  visa  from  France.      Soble 
had  an  assignment  from  the  Soviets  to   obtain  an  American 
woman  for  Albam  to   marry  and  to   set  Albam  up   in  business 
in  the  United  States.     Albam  lazs  married  to  an  American 
woman   in  the  Spring  of   19^8  and  returned  to  France,    later 
re-entering   the  United  States  as  an   immigrant  husband 
of  an  American  citizen  and  subsequently  applying  for 
American  citizenship.     He  purchased  an   interest    in  a 
business   in  New  York  which  later  went  bankrupt  and 
subsequently  he  was  employed  by  his  brother  who  operates 
a  business  in  New  York  City. 

Albam  has  been  described  as  a   specialist   in 
handwriting,    "copying"  and  photography.      When  contacted 
in   1955  by  Boris  Morros,   Albam  acknowledged  the  code 
name  assigned  by  his  Soviet   supervisors,   admitted  receipt 
of  money  to   establish  himself  in  this  country  and  agreed 
to   take  further  Soviet   instructions* 

Albam  was  also  arrested  on  January  25,    1957> 
and   indicted  on  the  same  charges  and  on  the  same  date 
as  the  Sobles.     He  pleaded  guilty  to   count   two  of  the 
indictment  on  February  26,    1957-      On  August   9»    1957* 
he  was  sentenced  to  five  and  one-half  years.     The  other 
counts  of  the   indictment  against  Albam  were  dismissed. 
On  October  8,    1957>   Albam' s  sentence  was  reduced  to 
five  years* 

3*     Jane  and  George  Zlatovski 

Jane  and  George  Zlatovski,  American  citizens 
currently  residing   in  France,    served  under  Jack  Soble' s 
supervision  from   1945  to    1951-      In  a   report    intercepted 
by  Boris  iiorros,   Jane  Zlatovski   claimed  that  while 
employed  by  the  U.   S.   Army   in  Austria   in   19^7  -    19^8, 
she  obtained  through  her  Army  employment  names,   photographs 
and  biographies  of  agents  of  the  Counter  Intelligence 
Corps  and  the  Central   Intelligence  Agency,    similar   infor- 
mation concerning   their   "native  agents"  and    "practically 
every  scheme  they  hatched."     Only  disruption  of  contact 

-  39  - 

with  her  superiors  prevented  successful   delivery  of 
such   information  to   the  Soviet   Intelligence  Service. 

Jane  and  George  Zlatovski   were   indicted  on 
July  8,    1957'     ^c   indictment  contained  two  counts 
charging   both  with  espionage  conspiracy  similar  to 
the  Soble   indictment.      The  Zlatovskis  were  not  arrested 
inasmuch  as  they  reside   in  France  and  efforts  to   effect 
their  return  from  France  to  date  have  been  unsuccessful. 

4.  Alfred  and  Mxrtha  Stern 

The  Sterns  are  both  American-born  citizens. 
They  were  originally   identified  as  Soviet  agents  by 
Boris  Morros   in  July,    194^,    when  he  reported  that   they 
had  participated  with  him  and  Vassili   Zubilin   in  the 
establishment  of  a  business  concern   (the  Boris  Morros 
Music  Company)   which  was  to   be  used  as  a    "cover"  for 
Soviet   intelligence  agents.     It  was  agreed  that  Stern 
would   invest  ^f JO, 000   in  Morros'   business,    become  an 
official  and  learn  the  business.      Since  Jack  Soble 
pleaded  guilty,    he  has  confirmed  that   the  Sterns  were 
Soviet  agents. 

When  the  Soble s  and  Albam  were  arrested  on 
January  25,    1957*    "t^e  Sterns  were  residing   in  Mexico 
City.     They  were  subsequently  served  with  subpoenas 
calling  for  their  appearance   in  New  York  City  before 
the  grand  jury  hearing  the  Soble  case.     They  refused 
to   honor  the   subpoenas  and  on  Mjy    1,    1957>    they  were 
fined  $25,000  each  for  contempt.      On  the  following 
date  warrants  were   issued  for  their  arrest,    as  material 
witnesses.     They  were  indicted  on  September  9>    1957*   on 
two  counts  charging  espionage  conspiracy  and  one  count 
charging  general   conspiracy.     The  Sterns  were  not 
arrested   inasmuch  as  they  fled  from  Mexico   to 
Czechoslovakia  clandestinely   in  July,    1957' 

5.  II va  Wolston 

Wolston  was  born   in  Russia.     He  entered  the 
United  States  on  April  JO,    19J9'     Se  was  naturalized 
a  United  Stales  citizen  on  May    l8,    194J.      In   1942  - 
1946  he  served   in  the  U.   S.   Army,    in   194J  attending 
the  U,   S.  Army  Intelligence  School   at  Camp  Ritchie. 

-  40  - 

On  several   occasions  beginning  May  y,    19S^r 
Jack  Soble  furnished  Boris  Morros  with    information 
concerning  an    individiml   he  described  as  a  U.S.    Army 
Colonel    in   Germany  who  furnished  him    information   under 
the   code  name    "Slava, "  which  was   very  valuable   to   the 
Soviets.      It    is  noted   that  from  October,    19^9t    until 
July,    19^1  f    Wolston   was  employed   by   the   U.S.   High 
Commissioner  of  Germany   in  Berlin.      In  January,    1955 1 
Soble    identified  his  nephew,    Ilya  Wolston  as   "Slava." 
In  addition.    Jack  Soble,    pleading  guilty    in  April, 
1957 >   furnished    information    identifying   Wolston  as  a 
Soviet  agent   who  provided  him    information  for   the 
Soviets  on   several    occasions   beginning  when   Wolston 
was    in  a  military  camp,    aboui    194J.      Soble   said   Wolston 
gave   him    information   concerning  his  assignments  and 
names  of  four  persons  at   the   camp  whom  he  believed  could 
be  approached  by  the  Soviets. 

Information  concerning   the  probable    identifica- 
tion of  Wolston  as  a  Soviet  agent  was  furnished   to   the 
Department   of  State    in   195^f    together  with  data  developed 
concerning   his   black  market  activities    in  Germany.      The 
Department   of  State,    on   the   basis  of  these  data,   dismissed 
Wolston  from  his  employment    in  Berlin. 

On  August   IJ,    195^>    Wolston  was  sentenced   to 
one  year's   imprisonment  for  contempt  for  failure   to 
appear  before  a  Federal    Grand  Jury    in  July,    1958.      The 
sentence  was  suspended  and  he  was  placed  on   three   years' 
probation  conditioned  on  his  being  available   to  process 
of  the  court  within   the   three-year  period. 

Mark  Zborowski 

Zborowski  was  born    in  Russia  and  became  a 
naturalized  U.    S.    citizen    in  New  York  City   in  June,    194'p. 
Zborowski   was  employed  as  a  language   consultant    in   19^3- 
1944-  by   the   War  Department    in  New  York   City.      Jack  Soble 
advised   that  Zborowski   acted  as  a  Soviet  agent  under  his 
supervision  during    the  approximate   period   194J-1945t 
furnishing    information  concerning  Trotskyites  and  other 
anti-Stalin  elements.      Zborowski  denied  knowing  Soble 
before  a   Grand  Jury    in  February  and  March,    195? t    ond    in  an 
interview  August   11,    1957*      However,    when   confronted  by 
Soble   on  August  7,    1957 >    ^^  admitted  Soble   had  been 
one   of  his  espionage   superiors. 

Zborowski   was    indicted  for  perjury  April   I8,    195^) 
was  found  guilty  after  trial   on  November  20,    1953,    and  on 
December  8,    195^,    loas  sentenced   to  five   years'    imprisonment. 
On  November  10,    1959)    the   Court   of  Appeals   reversed   the 
conviction  and   remanded   the   case  for  a  new  trial. 

-  41   - 

7.  Vassili  Molev 

Vassili  Molev,    while  attached   to   the  Soviet 
Delegation   to   the   United  Nations,   New  YorK  City,    in   19S3 
(handling  maintenance,    purchase   of  supplies  and  similar 
matters)  met  Boris  Morros  on  a  date  and  at  a   time  and  place 
previously  designated  by  Morros'   Soviet    intelligence 
superiors   in  Austria,     Molev  accepted  from  Morros  a   report 
prepared   in  New  York  by  Jack  Soble  and  given   by  Soble   to 
Morros   in  accordance  with   instructions  from   their  Soviet 
superiors.      Photographs,    both  still   shots  and  motion 
pictures,    of  this  meeting  were  taken  by  FBI  personnel. 

Immediately  following   the  arrest   of  Jack  Soble 
on  espionage  charges  on  January  2$,    1957>    ^^^   ^*  ^' 
Department   of  State  declared  Molev  persona  non  grata. 
Molev  at   that   time  was  employed  (in  a  similar  capacity) 
by  the  Soviet  Embassy,    Washington,   D.C.     He   left   the  United 
States  on  January  2a,    195? t    «"  route   to  Russia. 

8.  Mikhail  Nikolaevich  Svirin 

Mikhail  Svirin,   a  Soviet  assigned   to   the  Soviet 
United  Nations  Delegation,   New  York  City,   from  August,    1952, 
to  April,    195^i    ^■oas    identified  by  Yuri  A.   Rastvorov,    a 
former  Soviet    intelligence   officer,   as  a  member  of  the 
Ministry  of  Internal  Affairs  and  a   very  experienced 
intelligence  officer. 

On   two   occasions   in  January  and  February, 
J-953>    Svirin  was  observed    in   the  area  where  Boris 
Morros  was  scheduled   to  meet   with  his  Soviet  superior, 
Morros  subsequently  met   Vassili  Molev  on  March  J,    19S3* 
at   the  scheduled  meeting  place. 

Reino  Hayhanen,   former   illegal   Soviet 
intelligence  agent,   advised  he  first  met  Svirin    in 
Moscow  when  Hayhanen   returned  from  Finland   in  19$2, 
Just  prior   to  being  dispatched   to   the   United  States 
as  an   illegal   agent.      After  his  arrival    in   this 
country  he  met  Svirin  on   two   occasions  during   the 
period  1952-195^  and  ultimately  Svirin  arranged  for 
him   to  meet  Rudolf  Abel,   another  Soviet    illegal  agent. 

Svirin  also  served  as  an  employee   of  the 
United  Nations  Secretariat  from  September,    19^4,    until 
October  24,    1957,    when  he  last  departed  from   the   United 

-  42  - 

g.      The   Colonel  Rudolf  Ivanovich  Abel   Case 

1.  Reino  Hauhanen 

On  May  6,    1957,   Reino  Hayhanen,    a  Soviet   citizen, 
walked   into   the  American  Embassy   in  Paris,   France,    and  advised 
that  he  uoas  a  Lieutenant   Colonel    in   the  Soviet  State  Security 
Service  and  had  been    involved   in  Soviet  espionage    in   the 
United  States  for   the  past  five   years.     He  had   in  his 
possession  an  American  passport    issued   in   the  name   of  Eugene 
Nicolai  Mahi,    bom  May  JO,    1919,   Enaville,    Idaho.     He  advised 
he  had  been  assigned   in   the  United  States   (1)   to   locate  possible 
recruits  for  Soviet   espionage,    (2)   to   obtain   information  about 
new  military   installations   in   the   United  States,    and   (3)   to 
check  up  on  certain    individuals  who  were  of   interest   to  Soviet 
Intelligence.     He  had  been  unsuccessful  and   then  laas  ordered   to 
return   to  Moscow.     At   the   time   of  his  appearance    in  Paris,    he 
was  on  his  my  to   the  Soviet   Union  but  was  afraid  to   return 
because  of  possible  measures   the  Soviets  might   take  against 
him  for  his  failure.      On  May  10,    1957,  Hayhanen  was   returned 
to   the   United  States  by  plane  at  his  own  request. 

Hayhanen   revealed  he  had  been  drafted   into   the 
NKVD  in  1939.     Following   initial    training  and  experience 
along   the  Finnish  border,    he   was  ordered   to  Moscow  in  1948 
for  assignment  with  the    "illegal"  or   "deep  cover"  section 
of  the  Soviet  State  Security  Service.      There  he  was  given   the 
name  of  Eugene  Maki    {American-born  of  Estonian  parents  who 
had  been   returned  as  a  child   to  Estonia)  and  briefed  for 
assignment    in   the   United  States.      To  perfect  his   "legend"   (false 
background)  he  went   to  Estonia  and   then   to  Finland  under  his 
assumed  name  and   identity.     Having  learned  the  English  language 
and  American  customs  and  been   trained   in  surveillance,    secret 
writing,   coding  and  the  preparation  of  microfilm,   he  arrived 
in   the  United  States  October  21,    195^' 

2.  Colonel  Rudolf  Ivanovich  Abel 

During  Hayhanen's  assignment    in   the   United  States, 
he  had  two  Soviet  principals.      The    identity  of  his  first 
principal    (I952-I953)  was  established  as  Mikhail  Nikolaevich 
Svirin,   First  Secretary  of  the  Soviet  Delegation   to   the 
United  Nations    in  1952-1953  and  later  Assistant   to   the  Assistant 
Secretary-General   of  the   United  Nations  from  1954-1956. 
Hayhanen  knew  Svirin   only  as   "Mikhail   Ivanovich. "     His  other 
superior   in   the   United  States   (1954-1957)  "ws  a  colonel    in   the 

-  43  - 

Soviet  State  Security  Service  he  knew  only  as   "Mark." 
Investigation  subsequently   identified   "Mark"  as  Ehiil  R. 
Goldfus,   who  maintained  a  photographic  studio   in  Brooklyn^ 
New  York. 

Based  on   information  furnished  by  the  FBI,   Goldfus 
was  apprehended  June  21,    195? t    ^V  ^^*  Immigration  and  Naturaliza- 
tion Service  at  a  hotel    in  New  York  City  where  he  was   residing 
under  the  name  of  "Martin  Collins,"  and  charged  with   illegal 
entry   into   the  United  States,     He  claimed  his   true  name   to  be 
Rudolf  Ivanovich  Abel,   Soviet  citizen.      On  August  7,    1957*    ^^ 
was   indicted  by  a  Federal   Grand  Jury   in  New  York  on   two  counts 
of  espionage  conspiracy  and  one  count  charging  him   to  be  an 
agent  of  a  foreign  principal  without  notification  to   the  Secretary 
of  State.      On  October  2$,    1957,  Abel  was  found  guilty  on  all 
counts  and  on  November  15,    1957t    foas  sentenced   to  a  period  of  JO 
years  on   the  first  count,    10  years  and  a  $2,000  fine  on   the 
second  count,   and  a  $1,000  fine  on   the   third  count,    sentences   to 
run  concurrently  as   to  confinement  and  consecutively  as  to  fines. 
Abel's  conviction  was  affirmed  by  the  United  States  Court  of 
Appeals  on  July  11,    1958.     Bis  conviction  was  also  affirmed  by 
the  United  States  Supreme   Court   on  March  28,    196O. 

Methods  used  by  Hayhanen  and  Abel    in   their  contacts 
toere    ingenious.      In  order  to  contact  his  superiors,  Hayhanen 
would  place  chalk  marks  at   various  predesignated  points.      To 
minimize  personal   contacts  and  subsequent  danger  of  compromise 
by  surveillances,   a  system  of  widely  separated   "dead  drops" 
or  "banks"  was  established   throughout   the  metropolitan  area 
of  New  York.      These  drops  were  located   in  such  places  as 
Prospect  Park,   Riverside  Drive,  Fort  Tryon  Park,   and  Central  Park, 
Use  was  made   of  hollowed-out  coins,    bolts.   Jewelry,   magnetic 
containers,    and  other  objects   in  u^ich  xoould  be    inserted 
film  containing  code  or  plain  text  messages  and  other  material 
for  transmittal. 

?.      Rou  Adair  Rhodes 

One  of  Hayhanen' s  assignments   in   the  United  States 
was   to  locate  an  American  Army  Sergeant   by  the  name  of  "Quebec" 
uho  had  been   recruited  by  the  Soviets  while  assigned  to   the 
American  Embassy   in  Moscow  in  195^-      Investigation    identified 
"Quebec"  as  Master  Sergeant  Roy  Adair  Rhodes.      The   latter  has 
admitted  his  recruitment  stating  he  had  been  compromised   through 
a  Russian  girl    in  Moscow  with  it^om  he  had  an  affair.     He  stated 
he  was   in  contact  with  the  Soviets   in  Moscow  for  approximately 
two  years  but  had  furnished  no    information  of  value   to   them. 

-  44   - 

Upon  hia  return   to   the  United  States   in  19S3   'i*  severed  contacts 
with  the  Soviets.     Rhodes  was   tried  by  a  United  States  Army  Court 
Martial   on  charges  of  conspiracy  to   commit  espionage  and  signing 
a  false   loyalty  oath.     He  was  found  guilty  and  on  February  21, 
19^8,    was  sentenced   to  five  years  and  a  dishonorable  discharge. 
He  appealed  his  conviction   to   the  Board  of  Review,    United  States 
Army,    which  approved   the  sentence   imposed  on  Rhodes. 

.•  45  - 

"JANUARY  2,    1950,    THROUGH  ZdAY  1 ,    i960 

The  Soviet   Union  speaks   of   "peaceful   coexistence*  " 
Its  leaders   refer  to  Americans  as    "capitalist  warmongers,  "  to 
our  Government  as    "imperialistic,  "  our  actions  as  a   threat   to 
world  peace.     Khrushchev  has  made  much  of  our  attempts   to 
determine   the  existence  and  location  of  Soviet    intercontinental 
missile   bases,    offensive  weapons   of  war  concealed  behind   the 
Iron  Curtain  of  Soviet  secrecy.      With   irresponsible  exaggera- 
tions he  has  attempted  to  portray  the  United  States  as  an 
aggressor  nation. 

In  contrast   to  such   irresponsible  statements  has  been 
the  carefully  considered  action  of  the  United  States   in   those 
instances   in  which  Soviet   officials    in   this  country,    under 
cover  of  diplomatic    immunity  or  official   status,    have  engaged 
in  aggravated  acts  of  espionage. 

Among   the  numerous    incidents  of  Soviet   espionage 
during   the  past  decade   the  United  States  has   been  forced   to 
officially  request   the  withdrawal    of  19  Soviet   officials 
because  of  their  participation   in  espionage   operations  or  other 
action  completely   incompatible   with   their  continued  presence    in 
this  country. 

Though  such  action  has   been  essential    to   national 
dignity  and   the  security  of  the  United  States,    it  has   been 
frequently  unpubl icized,    unaccompanied  by  frenzied  charges  and 
irresponsible   threats  which  might   create   issues  prejudicial    to 
world  peace. 

A.      Yuri   Vasiluevich  Novikov 

Novikov  entered   the  United  States  April   24,   19^»    as 
an  attache  of  the  Soviet  Embassy,   Washington,   D.    C.     He  sub- 
sequently held  the  position  of  second  secretary  and  from  1950 
through  July,   1952,   acted  as   editor  of  the  official  publication 
of  the  Soviet  Embassy,    the    "Information  Bulletin. " 

-  46  - 

On  April   12,   1951,  Novihov,    by  meeting  a  source   in 
Washington,  D,    C,    was    identified  as   the  new  Soviet  principal 
in  an  espionage  operation  which  had   its  origin   in  Austria   in 
19^9'     Novikov,    on  April   12,   195l>    appeared  at   the  designated 
place   on   the  proper  date,    at   the  designated   time  and  gave   the 
password  previously  agreed  upon  between   the  source  and  his 
Soviet   espionage  superiors    in  Austria. 

The  original  principals   in  this  operation   in  Austria 
were   two  naturalized  citizens,    Otto   Verber  and  Kurt  L,  Ponger, 
who  were   brought   back   to   the   United  States  and  upon  entering 
guilty  pleas,    xvere,    on  June  8,   1953>    sentenced  for  violation 
of  the  espionage  statute, 

Novikov  operated  the  controlled  source    in  the 
United  States  until  April  22,   195^*   a"d  on  ten  occasions 
sought  classified  material. 

On  January  14,   1953t  Novikov  was  declared  persona 
non  grata   by  the  Department   of  State   in  connection  with  his 
espionage  activity.     He  departed   the  Uhited  States   on  January  19, 

B.      Igor  Aleksandrovich  Amosov 

Amosov  entered  the  Ohited  States  February  I/',   1952, 
as  Assistant  Soviet  Naval  Attache, 

Amosov  IMS   the   third  Soviet  principal    in  an   intelli- 
gence operation  directed  by  the  Soviets  from  their  naval 
attache's  office.     He  served   in   this  capacity  from  June  7> 
1952,    until   his  departure   in  February,    195'^"      Targets  assigned 
by  Amosov  to   the  controlled  source    included  radar  developments, 
details  of  the  latest   cargo  ships,    manuals  reflecting  details 
of  the  latest   electronic  developments  and  bombsight  data.     He 
paid  the  source  a   total   of  j^2,000  for  his  services. 

While   the  operation  functioned  under  Amosov' s  control, 
he  did  not  accept  any  material   directly  from  the  source,     Amosov 
furnished   instructions   to   the  source   in  Washington,   D,    C,   and 
the  material   was  passed   in   the  New  York  City  area  with  the 
source  following  a  set  precedure   of  obtaining  acknowledgement 
signals  and,    thereafter,   delivering   the  material    to  a  designated 
drop  area,     Amosov  was  declared  persona  non  grata   by  the  State 
Department   on  February  J,   195^}    as  a  result   of  his  activities 
in   this  case  and  he  left   the   United  States   on  February  7y   195^* 

-  47  ' 

C.     Aleksandr  Petrovich  Kovalev 

Kovalev  arrived   in  the  Vhited  States  October  8, 
19$0,   as  a  second  secretary  of  the  Soviet  Delegation  to   the 
Wiited  Nations, 

For  approximately  two  years  as  Assistant  Soviet 
Naval  Attache   in  Washington,    D.    C,  he  had  been  operating  a 
controlled  source,    obtaining  from  him  material    of   intelligence 
significance.      On  April    19,    195^,    the  Assistant  Soviet  Naval 
Attache   told   the  source   that    in  the  future,   material   obtained 
ujas   to  be  microfilmed  and   the  undeveloped  film  laas   to  be 
delivered   to   the  Soviets  by  means   of  a  dead  drop  located   in 
the  New  Fork  area   rather  than  through  direct  delivery  to   the 
Assistant  Naval  Attache.      The  source  was   told   to  park  his  car 
in  a  designated  area   in  New  York  City  at  a  designated   time  and 
to  place  a  package  wrapped   in  red  paper  therein  so  that   it 
could  be  seen  through   the  rear  window  in  the  event  material 
was   to  be  passed.     An  additional   signal  by  toay  of  marking  a 
telephone  directory  in  a  New  York  restaurant  was  perfected   to 
indicate  to  the  source  that   the  material  delivered  to  the  dead 
drop  was  picked   up. 

A   trial   run  of  this  arrangement   occurred   in 
New  York  City  on  April  23,    19$2,    on  which  date  Kovalev  was 
observed   in   the    immediate  vicinity  of  source's  car,    which  was 
parked   in  the  designated  area  and   in  which  was  placed  a  package 
wrapped   in  red  paper.      Thereafter,    the  source  deposited  material 
in  the  dead  drop  and  on  April  24,    195^»  Kovalev  was  observed 
making   the  predesignated  mark  in  the  telephone  directory  in 
the  New  York  restaurant. 

Material   of  intelligence  significance  was  left  by 
the  controlled  source   in  the  New  York  dead  drop  area  on 
October  1  and  December  3t    1952,    which  material   was   retrieved 
by  the  Soviets.      On  June  7,    ^952,    the  source  was  given  by  his 
Soviet  principal    in  Washington  §500   to  purchase  an  electronic 
device  for  delivery  to   the  Soviets  and  an  additional   $500   in 
payment  for  delivery  of  a  microfilm  reproduction  of  portions   of 
a  manual  dealing  with  an  automatic  steering  device  for  ships. 
The  controlled  source  last  heard  from  his  Soviet  principal   on 
April    1,    1953,    on  which  date  he  was   told   that  a  meeting 
scheduled  for  April  3,    1953>    would  not   be  held. 

-  48 

Kovalev  loas  declared  persona  non  grata   by  the 
Department   of  State  for  his  actions    in   this   case   on 
February  J,    195^^,    and  he  departed   the  United  States 
February  2  0,    19S4. 

D»     Leonid   Igorovich  Pivnev 

Pivnev  entered  the   United  States   on  Mirch  ly, 
1950,    as  Assistant  Soviet  Air  Attache. 

On  November  2  and  J,    I9S3>    while   on  a   tour 
throughout   the  Southwest,   Pivnev  purchased  aerial   maps  of 
Tulsa,    Oklahoma,    and   vicinity  and  Dallas,    Texas,    and  vicinity. 
Pivnev  did  not    identify  himself  as  a  Soviet   official   when 
purchasing  these  maps. 

In    the  Spring   of  1953>    through  a   Washington 
businessman,    he   endeavored    to   utilize   the   businessman's  address 
as  a  mail   drop.     He   explained   to   the   businessman   that  he  would 
have  nail  delivered   to  him  at   the   businessman's  address,    which 
mail    was   to   be  addressed   to  a  fictitious  person  and  which, 
upon  receipt,    was   to   be  del  ivered  by  the  businessman   to  him. 

On  March  24,    195^,    he    inquired  at   a   Virginia  aerial 
photographic  concern  as   to   the  possibil ity  of  purchasing 
aerial   maps   of  Chicago,    Illinois.     He    instructed   the  firm  to 
seek  such  maps  and  agreed   to  pay  approximately  ^8,000  for   them. 
On   that  date  he  purchased  JJ  aerial   photographs   of  Washington, 
D.    C,    and  vicinity.     Pivnev,    in  contacting   this  firm,    identi- 
fied himself  as   one    "George."    He  did  not    indicate  his  official 
connection  with  the  Soviet  Embassy. 

On  May  3,    1954,    he  contacted  a  Washington,   D,    C, 
photographer,    introducing  himself  as  a  Mr.    George  Tinney,    a 
representative   of  a  private  firm  desirous   of  purchasing  aerial 
photographs   of  New  York  City  at  a  scale   of  1:20,000  tol:40,000 
feet.     Photographs   of   this   type  were  not  commercially  available. 
On  May  IJ,   19^4,    he  agreed   to  pay   the  photographer  $700  to 
obtain   the  photographs.     He  advanced  on  that  date   the  sum  of 
0400  as  partial  payment. 

On  2iiy  20,    1954,    when  meeting  with  the  photographer 
for   the  purpose   of  obtaining   the  photographs,    he  was  accosted 
by  Special   Agents   of  the  Federal   Bureau  of  Investigation   on 
which  occasion  he    identified  himself.      On  my  29,   1954,    the 
Department   of  State  declared  Pivnev  persona  non  grata  for     his 
action,  and  he  departed  June  6,    1954' 

-  49  ' 

E,     M2ksim  GriQorievich  Martunov 

Mxrtynov  last   entered   the   United  States   on 
November  3i   195^)    as  a  member  of  the  Soviet  Representation 
to   the  Uhited  Nations  Military  Staff  Committee, 

In  August,   195^>    '^  highly  placed  Army  officer   in 
Germany  was    introduced   to  a  Soviet   under  clandestine  circum- 
stances   in   the  Soviet  sector  of  Berlin,      The  Soviet,    aware 
of  the  officer's  plan   to   retire  from  the  Army,    asked  him  to 
be   of  assistance  when  the  Soviet   came   to   the   United  States, 
The  officer  did  not  discourage   the  Soviet's  approach  and 
meetings    in  New  York  City  were  arranged,      A  code  phrase  was 
established  for  recognition  purposes. 

On  November  1$,    195^,    a  Special   Agent   of   the  Federal 
Bureau  of  Investigation,   made  up   to   resemble   the  Army  officer, 
was  contacted  at   the  agreed   time  and  place    in  New  York  City  by 
Martynov.     Prearranged  signals  were   exchanged  and  they  talked 
for  approximately  thirty  minutes,     Martynov   indicated  he  was  a 
friend  of  the  Soviet  who  contacted   the  officer   in  Germany  and 
he  asked  for   the   officer's  assistance,   paying  him  $2$0,     A 
subsequent  meeting  was  scheduled  for  January  1$,    1955' 

On  that  date,  Martynov  kept   the  appointment  and 
with  State  Department  permission,   FBI  Agents  accosted  him, 
Martynov   identified  himself  and  claimed  diplomatic    immunity. 
On  February  21,   1955>    'the  Department   of  State  declared 
Martynov  persona  non  grata  for  the  above  activity  and  he 
departed   the  United  States  February  26,   1955' 

F,      Aleksandr  Konstantinovich  Guri/anov 

Guryanov  entered   the  Uhited  States  March  26,   1955 > 
as  an  employee  of  the  Soviet  Delegation   to   the   Uhited  Nations, 

On  April  25,    195^>    Guryanov  was  declared  persona  non 
grata   by  the  [Mi ted  States  Department   of  State  as  a   result   of 
his    implication   in   the    improper  repatriation  ia   the   USSR  of 
five  Soviet  seamen  uMo  left   the   Uhited  States  on  April   7>   J-95^' 
The  seamen  were  members   of  the  crew  of  the  Soviet   tanker 
"Tuapse"  who  previously  defected   to    the  Uhited  States,      The 
Department    of  State    informed   the  Soviet  Government    that 
Guryanov's  activities  made  his  presence   in  the   Uhited  States 
no  longer  desirable  and  he  departed  May  9>   195^* 

-  50  - 

G-      Ivan  Aleksandrovich  Bubchikov 

Bubchikov   entered   the   United  States  December  1, 
195^t    <3s  cin  Assistant  Soviet  Military  Attache. 

From  July,    1955t    through  Ji£iy,   195^>    Bubchikov 
Tnaintained  contact   with  a  naturalized  American  citizen  of 
Russian   origin  who   was   employed  as  a  sales   engineer.      In 
July,    1955f    ^*  appeared  at   the  sales   engineer' s   residence 
late    in   the  evening  and  sought  his  cooperation   in  securing 
data   concerning  Jet  fuel,    atomic   submarines,    and  aeronautical 
developments.      Bubchikov  promised   the   engineer  large  sums   of 
money;   however,    even    though  seemingly   important    information 
was  furnished   to   him,    he  did  not  fulfill   his  promise   of 
large  payments.     During   the  course   of  this   operation   it  was 
featured   by  clandestine  meetings,    complex  recognition  signals, 
and  a   variety  of   "drop  areas"   in  which  the  source  deposited 
material  for  the  Soviet. 

In  view  of  his  activities    in  connection  v>ith   the 
engineer,    the  Department   of  State,    on  June  14,    195^>    declared 
Bubchikov  persona  non  grata  for  engaging    "in  espionage 
activities    incompatible  with  his  continued  presence    in   this 
country."    He  departed   the   United  States  June  24,   195^' 

H.      Boris  Fedorovich  Gladkov 

Gladkov  entered   the  United  States  December  1$, 
^953>   ^^  naval   advisor  to   the  Soviet  Representation   in   the 
Military  Staff  Committee   of  the   United  Nations   (UN). 

In  January,   1955>    Gladkov,    at  a   cocktail  party, 
met  a  sales   engineer  for  a  New  York  City  marine   engineering 
firm.     He  cultivated   the  sales   engineer  and  held  a  number  of 
clandestine  meetings  with  him.      Through  the  engineer,    on 
June  14,   1955}    ^^  received   two   unclassified  publications 
dealing  with  marine   boilers.      During  his  meetings   with   the 
sales   engineer  which  continued  on  a  regular  basis   through 
June,    1956,    Gladkov  furnished   the   engineer  ^1,550  for 
services  rendered. 

On  June  22,    195^,    the  Department   of  State  declared 
Gladkov  persona  non  grata  for  engaging    in    "activities  which 
were  highly   improper  and   incompatible"  with  his  status  as  a 
member  of  the  Soviet  Delegation   to    the   UN.     He  departed 
July  12,    1956. 

-  51    - 

I.     Rostislav  E.    Shapovalov 

Shapovalov  entered   the   United  States  September  2'P, 
1955 f    as  a  second  secretary  of  the  Soviet  Delegation  to   the 
IMi ted  Motions    (UN). 

On  Miy  7,    14,   ly  and  21,   195^>   Shapovalov  con- 
tacted a  Russian  emigre    in  New  York  City  and  urged  him  to 
return  to  Russia.      The  emigre,  Michael  Schatoff,    a  former 
officer   in   the  Russian  Army,    was  a  classmate  of  Shapovalov 
at  a  New  York  university. 

On  August  20,  195^>  i^^  Department  of  State  declared 
Shapovalov  persona  non  grata  for  his  activities  in  attempting 
to    induce  Schatoff   to   return   to    the  Soviet   Union. 

Shapovalov  departed  the  United  States  September  12, 

J.      Viktor  Ivanovich  Petrov 

Viktor  Ivanovich  Petrov  arrived   in   the 
United  States  February  ly,    1953)    ^s  a   translator  employed 
at   the   United  Nations   (UN)  Secretariat,  New  York  City. 

In  December,    1955>    ^^   responded   to  an  advertisement 
placed  in  a  New  York  newspaper  by  an  aviation  draftsman  for 
part-time  work.      The  draftsman  was  an  employee   of  one   of  our 
largest   aircraft  factories.      At    the   outset,   Petrov  gave   the 
draftsman    insignificant   drafting  work,    later  asking  him  to 
send  for  various   brochures   on.  aviation.      On  April  5)    195^' 
Petrov  requested   the  draftsman   to   obtain    information  concern- 
ing  United  States  military  aircraft.      The    information  sought 
loas   classified  and,    according   to    the   United  States  Air  Force, 
would  have   been  a  good  guide  concerning   the  status   of 
United  States  aircraft   development. 

On  August  20,   195^,    a   representative   of   the 
Department   of  Justice  and   the   United  States  Representative 
to    the   UN  conferred  with   the  Secretary  General    of   the   UN, 
who  agreed   to  dismiss  Petrov.      On  August  21,    195^,    charges 
against  Petrov  were  presented   to    the  Deputy  Soviet   UN  Repre- 
sentative and  on  August  2J,    195^,    the   UN  received  a    two-line 
resignation  from  Petrov  which  requested  acceptance   by 
August  2y,   1956'      The  Secretary  General    of  the   UN  agreed  not 
to  accept    the   resignation  and   to  proceed  with  Petrov' s 
dismissal .      Petrov  hurriedly  departed   the   United  States   on 
August  23,    1956. 

-  52   - 

K.     Konstantin  Pavlovich  Ekimov 

Ehimov  entered   the   Vhited  States   October  17, 
1955t    OS  second  secretary  of  the  Soviet  Delegation   to   the 
United  Nations   (W). 

Newspapermen  and  Immigration  and  Naturalization 
representatives    in   testimony  before   the  Senate   Internal 
Security  Subcommittee,    accused  Ekimov  of  participating   in 
the  abduction  of  Tanya  Chwastov,    aged  two,    an  American- 
born  daughter  of  a  Bussian   refugee.      It  was  alleged   that 
Ekimov  participated  on  October  J,    195^,    in  dockside  arrange- 
ments  enabling  Alexei   Chwastov   to  leave   the   United  States 
with  his    infant   daughter.      This  move  was  against    the  wishes 
of  the  child's  mother  who   remained    in   the   United  States. 
Ekimov  was  declared  persona  non  grata   by  the  Department  of 
State  on  October  29,   195^,    and  he  departed   the  United  States 
on  November  JO,    195^. 

L.     Yuri  Pavlovich  Krulov 

Krylov  entered   the   United  States  May  4,    1955>    "^s 
Assistant  Soviet  Military  Attache,    Washington,   D.    C. 

In  April,    195^1  Krylov  was   introduced  to   the 
manager  of  a  Washington  electronics  supply  house.      Through 
the  Washingtonian,    who  cooperated  with   the  Federal   Bureau 
of  Investigation,   Krylov  purchased  hard-to-grt   electronic 

In  August   of  1955t   Krylov  contacted  an  employee 
of   the  Atomic  Energy  Commission  and  attempted  to   obtain  from 
him   information  concerning   the   technical   aspects   of  nuclear 
power.      In  December,    1955i    ^*  contacted  a  former  commissioner 
of  the  Atomic  Energy  Commission   in  an  effort   to   develop 
information  concerning  atomic   energy  for  space  heating.      In 
February,   195^>    ^^  attempted  to  purchase  26  unclassified  films 
on  peace-time  atomic  energy. 

In  February,   195^>    ^*   endeavored   to  Join   the 
Society  of  American  Military  Engineers  and   to  subscribe   to 
the  publication    "The  Military  Engineer,"  ichich  contained 
information  concerning  United  States  fortifications. 

On  January  14,   195? >    the  Department   of  State 
declared  Krylov  persona  non  grata  as  a  result   of  his 
activities.     He  departed  the   United  States  January  26,    1957' 

-  53  - 


M>      Vassili  Mikhailovich  JiibJev 

From  August,   1944,    through  January,    1957*  M>2ev 
served  several    tours  of  duty  in   the   Uhited  States,    occupying 
position!  of  chauffeur  and  property  custodian   to   the  Soviet 
Consulate  General    in  New  York  and  property  custodian  at   the 
Soviet  Embassy,   Washington,  D,    C, 

Boris  liorros,   an  admitted  Soviet  agent  cooperating 
with^e  FBI,   was   instructed  by  his  Soviet  superiors  to  appear 
in   the   vicinity  of  $8  West  $8th  Street,  New  York  City,   at 
3  p»m,    on   the  first  Tuesday  of  each  month  for  contact   by  his 
Soviet  principal.      If  the  contact  was  not  made,  Morros  was 
instructed  by  the  Soviets   to   return   the  following  Wednesday 
and  Thur^ay.      On  Wednesday,   January  y,   1953>   Special  Agents 
of  the  Federal   Bureau  of  Investigation  observed  Molev   in   the 
vicinity  of  ^8  West  58th  Street,  New  York  City. 

Morros  was  later   instructed  by  his  Soviet  principal 
to  meet  his  Soviet  contact   on  Tuesday,  Mzrch  J,   1953t    on  the 
corner  of  Central  Park  South  and  Avenue   of  the  Americas, 
New  York  City.      On  Mxrch  J,   19S3*  liolev  was  observed     by 
Special   Agents  of  the  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation  con- 
summating a  meeting  with  Morros  at  Central  Park  South  and 
Avenue   of  the  Americas.      On  this  occasion  Morros  passed  to 
Molev  a  report  previously  obtained  from  Jack  Soble,  Morros' 
immediate  superior,    uho  was  subsequently  convicted  of  espionage. 
Molev,    on  Mxrch  J,   1953t    issued   instructions   to  Morros  for  a 
subsequent  meeting;   however,    that  meeting  was  not   effected* 

On  January  2$,   1957 >    Jack  Soble,  Myra  Soble,   and 
Jacob  Albam  were  arrested  on  charges   of  espionage  and  conspiracy* 
Simultaneously,  Molev  was  declared  persona  non  grata   because  of 
his    implication   in   the  conspiracy.     He  departed  the   United  States 
January  28,   1957. 

N.      Vladimir  Arsenevich  Grusha 

Vladimir  Arsenevich  Grusha  was  formerly  assigned  as 
first  secretary  of  the  Soviet  Delegation   to   the  Uhited  Nations 

On   the  night   of  March  5$   1957 y  Dhanapalo  Samarasekara, 
a  Ceylonese  national   employed  at   the  UN  Secretariat,  New  York 
City,    was   observed  by  Special   Agents  of  the  Federal   Bureau  of 
Investigation   (FBI)    to   enter  the  Ceylonese  Delegation   to   the  UN. 

-  54   - 

At  7  P'fi.    on  that  date  Samaras ehara  was   observed  on   the  fourth 
floor  of  that   building  opening  what  appeared   to   be  a  file 
cabinet   and  examining  some  papers.     He   was   observed   to  have 
left   the  delegation  shortly  thereafter  carrying  an  airline- 
type  handbag.     He  drove   to  an  area  where   Vladimir  Grusha  was 
observed  standing  on  a  corner.     Approximately  one  ?wur  later 
Samarasekara  was  observed   to   return   to    the  same  area   where 
Grusha  was  seen  getting    into  Samaras ekara's  automobile.     After 
driving  a  short  distance,    Grusha  left   the  car  and  Samarasekara 
returned   to   the  Ceylonese  Delegation.     He  was  at   that    time 
observed  on   the  fourth  floor  of  the   building  where  he  was 
observed  opening   the  same  file  cabinet  he   opened  earlier   in 
the   evening.     He  was   then  observed  carefully  placing  a   red 
book   in   the  cabinet.     He  left   the  delegation  shortly  thereafter. 

It  loas  subsequently  learned  that   the  Ceylonese  code 
book  was  red   in  color  and  that   the  code  room  of  the  Ceylonese 
Delegation  was  located  on   the  fourth  floor  of  the   Ceylonese 
Delegation  building. 

Subsequently   interviewed,   Samarasekara  admitted 
going   to   the   Ceylonese  Delegation  building  and  later  meeting 
with  Grusha   on   the  night   of  ISxrch  5t   ^957'     He  denied  passing 
any   information  to   the  Soviet, 

Based  on   information  developed  by  the  FBI,    the 
Department   of  State  declared  Grusha  persona  non  grata  on 
I£Lrch  2$,   1957t    <3;nd  he  departed  from  the   United  States  on 
April   10,    1957'      The  Department   of  State   instructed  the 
United  States  Mission   tothe  UN  to  request   the  Secretary  General 
of  the  UN  to  dismiss  Samarasekara  from  the  UN  Secretariat, 
Samarasekara   was  advised  on  July  5>    1957i    that  he  was  suspended 
with  pay,     A  committee   was  appointed  by  the  Secretary  General 
to    investigate   the  allegations  against  him  and  on  December  l6, 
1957>    the  Secretary  General    informed   the   United  States  Mission 
to   the  UN  that  he  had   terminated  Samaras ekara  ' s   employment. 

0.      Gennadi  Fedorovich  Mashkantsev 

Mxshkantsev  served  as  an  employee   of  the  Consulate 
Division  of  the  Soviet  Embassy,    Washington,  D.    Co,    handling 
repatriation  matters.     He  arrived   in   the   Ifiiited  States 
October  2$,   1956. 

On  March  12,  1957*  ^^  appeared  at  the  home  of  Petr 
Pirogov,  Russian  flyer  who,  with  Anatoli  Barsov,  defected  to 
the  mi  ted  States   in  Austria    in  1948.      Barsov  redefected  to 

-  55  - 

Bussia    in  19^9  and,    according   to   Vladimir  Petrov,    the 
former  Soviet    intelligence  officer  who  defected   in  Australia, 
after  lengtly  interrogation  uxis   executed* 

Upon  visiting  Pirogov,  Mishkantsev  delivered  to 
him  a  lengthy  handiaritten  letter  purportedly  from  Barsov. 
The  letter  petitioned  Pirogov  to  return   to   the  OSSB.     Examina- 
tion of  the  letter  established   that    it  was  not    in   the  hand- 
writing of  Barsov  but  was  a  carefully  prepared  simulation* 
As  a   result,    on  April   17,   1957)  Mishkantsev  was  declared 
persona  non  grata  for   "improper  activities  directed   toward 
inducing  return   to   the  Soviet   [fiiion  of  persons  who   have 
sought  asylum   in   the   United  States. "     Mishkantsev  departed 
April   25,    1957- 

P.     Nikolai   Ivanovich  Kurochkin 

Kurochkin  entered  the  United  States,   April  4,   195^t 
as  a   third  secretary  of  the  Soviet  Embassy,   Washington,   D,    C, 

In   the  Fall    of  1956,    Charles  T.    Beaumet,   a  pro- 
fessional  writer,    contacted  the  Soviet  Embassy  seeking 
statistics  as   to  hosiery  production   in   the  Soviet  Union.     He 
met  Kurochkin,  who  supplied  the  desired  statistical   data  and, 
after  a  series  of  meetings,  informed  Beaumet   that    if  he  would 
obtain  military   information   to   be    incorporated   in  articles 
Kurochkin  was  writing  for  Buss ian  military  journals,    he  would 
share  with  him  his  proceeds  from  the  articles.      Thereafter, 
Beaumet,    utilizing   the   entree  he  enjoyed  as  a  reporter, 
obtained   training  and  field  manuals  of  the  U«   So   Army  vahiph 
he   turned  over  to  Kurochkin.     For  the  various  manuals  delivered 
to  Kurochkin,   Beaumet  was  paid  approximately  $450„      Included 
among   the  manuals  sought   by  Kurochkin  were   two  which  were 
classified.      The  classified  manuals  were  not  delivered   to 
the  Soviet. 

0?i  June  6,   195^>  Kurochkin  was  declared  persona 
non  grata  for  engaging    in  highly   improper  activities 
incompatible  with  his  diplomatic  status.     He  departed  from 
the  United  States  on  June  11,   195^' 

Q.     Kirill  Sergeevich  Doronkin 

Doronkin  arrived   in   the  United  States  March  12, 
1956*    to  serve  as  Film  Editor,  Badio  and  Visual  Division 
of  the  Department   of  Public   Information,    l^i ted  Nations   (UN) 

-56  - 

Secretariat.     He   returned  to   the   USSR  on  home  leave 
April   17,   19S^>    <2"^  re-entered   the   United  States  July  29, 

In  October,   195^>    ^  source   recruited  by  the 
Soviets   obtained  aerial  photographs   of  the  Chicago  area  for 
delivery  to  an  unknown   individual   whom  he  loas    instructed   to 
meet  at  a  prearranged  spot    in   the  parking  area  adjacent   to 
the  railroad  station   in  Soarsdale,  New  York*      On  November  1$, 
1956}    the  source  arrived  at    the  designated  area   to  keep  his 
scheduled  meeting  with   the  unknoum  Soviet.     Special   Agents  of 
the  Federal   Bureau  of  Investigation  observed  Doronkin  and  his 
wife  arrive  at   the  parking  lot  at  6  p.m.,  November  1$,    195^* 
At   6:^$  p.m.  Doronkin  and  his  wife  left   their  car  and  uhile 
Doronkin's  wife  strolled  about   the    immediate  area,   Doronkin 
was  seen   to   talk   to   the  source.      The  source  was   observed   to 
pass   to  Doronkin  a  paper-wrapped  package  which  he   took  from 
the   trunk  of  his  automobile.     Shortly  thereafter   the  source, 
Doronkin  and  his  wife  re-entered   their  respective  cars  and 
left   the  area.      The  source  reported   that  he   turned  over  to 
Doronkin   the  requested  atrial  photographs  of  the  Chicago  area. 

The  United  States  Mission   to   the  UN  delivered  a 
note   to   the  Secretary  General    of  the   UN  on  January  1$,    1959> 
requesting  Doronkin's  dismissal  from  the   UN  because  of  this 
activity.     Doronkin's  contracted  term  of  entployment    terminated 
jUUrch  J,    1959t   and  he  was  not  re-employed  by  the   UN.     He 
departed  from  the  United  States  Itfarch  11,   1959' 

R.      Evgeni  Alekseevioh  Zaostrovtsev 

Zaostrovtsev  entered   the   United  States  August  2, 
1957>    °s   "3  second  secretary  of  the  Soviet  Embassy,    JfHshington, 
D.    C. 

On  February  2J,    1958>   Zaostrovtsev  met  a  State 
Department  foreign  service  officer   in   training, at  a  social 
function.      There  followed   intensive   efforts  on   the  part   of 
Zaostrovtsev  to  cultivate   the  State  Department   employee  for 
intelligence  purposes.      Between  February,   195^*    a"<^  February:^, 
1959f    he  met  with   the  State  Department   employee   on  1$ 
occasions.     He  obtained  from  the  State  Department   employee 
material    concerning  the   training  program  of  foreign  service 
officers  and  endeavored,    without  success,    to   obtain  classified 
documents  from  State  Department  files  concerning   the  political 
and  economic  affairs    in   the  area   of  the  GovernniBnt   employee's 
future  foreign  assignment.     He  paid   the  Government   employee 
fl50  for   information  furnished   to  him. 

-  57  - 

A3  a  result  of  his  dealings  with  the  State 
Department   employee,    the  Department   of  State  on  Mzy  IJt 
19$9t   made  an   informal    request   of  the  Soviet  Embassy  for 
Zaostrovtsev's  recall.      Zaostrovtsev  departed  the 
United  States  on  Miy  1$,    1959- 

S.      Vadim  Aleksandrovich  Kirilxjuk 

Kirilyuk  arrived   in  the  United  States  September  11, 
195S>   as  a  political   affairs  officer  enq)loyed  by  the 
Department  of  Trusteeship  and  Information  from  Non-Self 
Governing  Territories,    United  Nations   (UN)  Secretariat*      In 
April,   1959>   <3n  American  citizen  contacted  a  Soviet  official 
in  Mexico  City  concetning  the  possibility  of  obtaining  a 
Soviet  university  scholarship.     The  Soviet  obtained  complete 
background   information  from  the  American,    including  the  facts 
concerning  his  previous  assignment    in  cryptographic  machines 
and  systems  while  serving   in   the  Uhited  States  Army*     following 
his  return  to   the  United  States,    the  American  was  contacted 
by  Kirilyuk,   who   identified  himself  as  one  "George." 

During  the  period  from  June  through  September,   1959 1 
Kirilyuk  met  with  the  American   in  a  clandestine  manner  on  five 
occasions.     On  these  occasions  he  requested  data  concerning 
cryptographic  machines  and  instructed  the  American  to  seek 
employment  with  a     vital  Uhited  States  Government  agency, 
Kirilyuk's  meetings  with  the  source  on  August  28,   1959*   ond 
on  September  l8,   1959>   were  observed  by  Special  Agents  of 
the  Federal   Bureau  of  Investigation. 

The  Secretary  General    of  the   UN  was    informed  of 
Kirilyuk's  espionage  activity  on  December  I/',   1959*      On 
January  7)    19^0,    the  Soviet  Delegation   to   the   UN  was  advised 
of  Kirilyuk's  activities,   whereupon  Kirilyuk  and  his  family 
left   the  Ifiiited  States   on  January  10,    I96O. 

58  - 


Espionage ,    by   its   very   nature,    ia   international   - 
the   attempt  by  one   oountry   to   obtain  the    aeorets   of  another. 
Frequently  a  third  country,    beoauae   of   its   neutrality  or 
atrategic  acceaaibility,    ia  uaed  aa  a   baae  for  auch  operationa, 
its   citigena,    often  having  privilegea   aa  alliea   of  the   target 
country,    recruited  aa   agenta.      The  Soviet  Union,    now  critical 
of  American  uae   of  overaeaa   baaea,    haa  for  many  yeara  directed 
espionage   operationa   againat  the  United  Statea   through  other 
countries.     Petr  Derjabin,    Soviet   intelligence   officer  who 
defected   in  Auatria    in  1954,    atated   that    in  December,    1951, 
when  Lieutenant  General  Sergei  R.   Savchenlso  became  Chief  of 
the  GRU   (Soviet  Military  Intelligence  Service),    he    iaaued 
ordera   that    it  would  be   neceaaary  to    intensify  operationa 
against  the   United  States  from  beyond  our  borders.     His 
instructions  have   been  carried  out, 

A,      Dr,  Alan  Nunn  Uav 

Dr.   Alan  Nunn  Hay  waa  born  in  Birmingham,   England, 
in  1911,     In  1943  he  was  sent  to  Canada  with  a  group  of 
prominent  British   nuclear  phyaioiata  to  worlf  on  the   atomic 
bomb  project  for   the  Canadian  Department   of  Scientific  and 
Industrial  Research. 

Igor  Gouaenko,   Soviet  code   clerk  who  defected   in 
Canada  September  5,    1945,    described  May  as   one   of  the  most 
important  Soviet  agents  under  Colonel  Nikolai  Zabotin,   Soviet 
Military  Attache   and  chief  of  Soviet  Military  Intelligence 
operationa    in  Canada,      Dr,   May  furnished  Zabotin's   organi- 
sation with   voluminous,    vitally   important    information  concern- 
ing atomic  fusion,    including  specimens   of  uranium  833  and 
uranium  835,     Gousenko   stated  that  May  had   been   in  the  pay 
of  the  Soviet  Union  for  many  years  and  had  been  a  secret 
member  of  the  Communist  Party  of  Great  Britain, 

Immediately  after  the   bombing   of  Hiroshima   in 
August,    1945,   Zabotin  wired   to  Moscow  certain   iryformation 
received  from  May,   forwarded  a  report  by  May  setting  forth 
production  figurea   and  furnished  a  amall   quantity  of 
uranium  833,     May  had  access   to  uranium  833   in  connection 
with  his  work   in  Canada  but  did   not  have   access   to 
uranium  835  which  may  have   been  obtained  when  he   visited 

-  59  - 

the  Metallurgical  Laboratory  of  the  University  of  Chicago   in 
September  and  October,   1944-,     Miy  also  furnished  to   the 
Russians    information  concerning   the  proximity  fuse. 

Mxy  returned   to   the  United  Kingdom   in  September, 
19^5t    ond   in  February,   19^6,    was  arrested  by  British  authori- 
ties   in  London  and  charged  with  violation  of  the   Official 
Secrets  Act,     Subsequently,    on  a  plea  of  guilty,  Miy  was 
sentenced   to  serve  10  years    in  a  British  penitentiary, 

B.  Sam  Carr 

From  information  furnished  by  Igor  Gouzenko,    together 
with  documents  which  he  abstracted  from  the  Soviet  Embassy  in 
Canada,    it  was   established   that  Sam  Carr  was  one   of  the  most 
important   espionage  agents   operated  by  the  Soviet  Military 
Intell  igence  Service    in  Canada  during  19^2-194-$.     Sam  Carr, 
born  as  Schmil  Kogan  July  ^,    1906,   at  Kharkov,  Russia,    was 
naturalized  as  a  Canadian  citizen    in  1931*     An  old  communist 
of   international   reputation,    he  had  long  been  active   in 
illegal  and  intelligence  work. 

In  Mxrch,   1946,  following  the  defection  of  Igor 
Gouzenko,    Carr  suddenly  disappeared  from  Canada,   fleeing 
behind   the   Iron  Curtain.     Having  altered  his  appearance 
and  assumed  a  new  name  and   identity,    Carr  surreptitiously 
entered   the   Uhited  States    in  the  Fall    of  19^8  and   in  January, 
1949>    was  apprehended  by  the  FBI   in  New  York  City.      Carr  was 
returned   to  Canada  and  on  April   8,    1949*    "ws  convicted   in 
Ottawa   of  conspiracy  to   violate  Canadian  law  in   the  procure- 
ment  of  a  fraudulent  passport.     He  was  sentenced   to  six  years 
in  prison. 

C.  Ignacu  Samuel  Witczak 

One  of  the    individuals  for  whom  Sam  Carr  was 
instructed   to   obtain  false  documentation  was  a  Soviet  agent 
using   the  assumed  name  of  Ignacy  Sarmiel   Witczak.     According 
to   Igor  Gouzenko,  Moscow  had   instructed   the  Soviet  Military 
Attache   of  Ottawa    in  August,   194-5}    to   obtain  a  Canadian 
passport  for  a  Soviet  agent   then   in  Los  Angeles,    California, 
under  the  name  of  Witczak.      Gouzenko  stated  that   the  latter's 
function   in   the  United  States  was   to   operate  a  network  of 
Soviet  agents    in   the  event   of  a  break   in  United  States- 
Soviet  diplomatic  relations.     However,    the  FBI  established 
that  Witczak  was   engaged   in  recruiting   individuals   in   the 

-  60  - 

United  States  for   intelligence  assignments    in  the   Orient 
and  South  America.      The  persons   recruited  were  given  funds, 
passage,    and    i?istr-uctions  for  establishing  contact  with  other 
Soviet  agents  upon  reaching   their  destination. 

The  Soviet  agent  posing  as  Witczak  had  assumed   the 
name  and    identity  of  a  real   Ignacy  Samuel  Witczak,    a  Polish- 
bom  naturalized  citizen  of  Canada  who  had  served  with  the 
Loyalists    in  Spain  and  had  surrendered  his  Canadian  passport 
upon  arrival    in  that   coimtry  in  1937'      Using   this  passport,    the 
false  Witczak,    a  Soviet    illegal  agent,    had  arrived   in   the 
United  States   the  following  year. 

In  New  York  City   in  194$,    Witczak,    the   impostor,   was 
in  contact  with  Leonid  S.   Ualov,    clerk  of  the  Soviet   Consulate, 
who  was   clearly   implicated   in  Soviet   espionage  operations  and 
in  November,    194$,   was  also    in  contact  with  Lieutenant  Nikolai  G. 
Red  in  who  loas   brought   to   trial   the  following  year  on  charges 
of  espionage.      In  California  the  false  Witczak  was    in  contact 
with  Mikhail  F.   iAikhachev,    Assistant   to   the  Soviet   Vice-Ccnsul 
in  Los  Angeles  and  a  reported  Soviet    intelligence  agent. 

The  Soviet  agent  posing  as   Ignacy  Samuel  Witczak 
disappeared  November  21,    194$.     uis  most   intimate  associate   in 
the  United  States  was   Clarence  H.    Vetterli,    whom  Witczak  had 
used   in  making  contact  with  potential   recruits.      On  the  basis 
of  denials,    before  a  Federal  Grand  Jury   in  Los  Angeles,    of 
participation   in  Witczak's    intelligence  operations,    Vetterli 
was  convicted  July  12,    19$1,    on  charges   of  perjury  and   on 
July  2$,    19$1,   was  sentenced  to  a  total   of  sijc  years   imprison- 

\  ment, 


D.     Emil  Julius  Klaus  Fuchs 

Forced   to  flee  his  native  land   in  1933*   ^H  Julius 
,  Klaus  Fuchs,    German-bom  nuclear  physicist^  sought   refuge   in 
i  Great  Britain.      In  1941,    having  received  the  greater  portion 
I   of  his   higher  education   in  Great  Britain,   Fuchs  was   entrusted 
:   with  research  work  on  atomic  energy.      Almost    immediately 

he  sought  out  Soviet  agents   to  whom  he  could  and  did  give 

secret   information  to  which  he  had  access. 

\  In  December,    1943,   Fuctis  arrived   in  the  United  States 

I   as  a  member  of  a  group  of  British  scientists  selected   to  carry 
on  further  atomic   research   in  coordination  with  that   of  this 
country.     Before  leaving  Britain,   Fucfis  had  perfected  arrange- 
ments to  continue  his   espionage  operations.     As  a  result  of 

-  61   - 

such  arrangements,    relayed   through  Moscow,    Fuchs  was  placed 
in  contact  with  Barry  Gold  who  was   in  contact  with  Anatoli  A, 
Yakovlev,    clerk  of  the  Soviet   Consulate   in  New  Fork  City, 
From  early  1944  through  September,    19^5,   Fuchs  worked  with 
Manhattan  Engineer  District    in  New  York  and  at   the   Los  Alamos 
Laboratory   in  New  Mexico,   during  which  time  he   repeatedly 
transmitted  secret  atomic  energy   information  to  Yakovlev 
through  Harry  Gold,      Upon  returning   to  England   in  June,    19^> 
Fuchs  continued   to  supply  his  Soviet   superiors  with  secret 
infOTTnation  concerning  atomic  research  until  19^9*      Interrogated 
by  British  authorities,    on  January  27,    1950,    Fuchs  confessed 
to  his  operations  on  behalf  of  the  Soviet   Ifiiion, 

On  March  1,    1950,   Fuchs  entered  a  plea  of  guilty 
in  England   to  charges  of  violating   the   Official  Secrets  Act 
and  was  sentenced   to   14  years   in  prison, 

E,     Pontecorvo,   Burgess  and  Maclean 

In  September,    1950,    several  months  after  the  arrest 
of  atomic  spy  Emil  Julius  Klaus  Fuchs,   an  outstanding  British 
scientist.   Dr.   Bruno  Fontecorvo,   disappeared  behind   the  Iron 
Curtain,      Thirty-seven  years  of  age  at   the   time,   Pontecorvo 
was  a  naturalized  British  subject    of  Italian  birth.     He  had 
worked  with  Enrico  Fermi    in  Home,    Italy,    until  193^  when  he 
went   to  Paris,   France,    to  escape  religious  persecution  under 
the  fascist   regime.      In  Paris,    he  worked  with  Frederic  Joliot- 
Curie,    leading  French  nuclear  physicist  and  admitted  communist, 
Pontecorvo  fled  from  France  following  the   invasion  by  Nazi 
forces   in  1940,      One   of  the  scientists  responsible  for  the 
development   of  the  Neutron  Theory,    subsequently  applied   in 
the  creation  of  the  atomic  bomb,    he  arrived   in  the   Ohited  States 
in  August,    1940,      Here  he  was  employed  by  a  private  concern   in 
the   location  of  oil  deposits  but   later  engaged   in  atomic   energy 
experiments  and  cosmic  ray  research  for  the  British  Government 
in  Canada  and  at   the   time  of  his  disappearance  was  employed  at 
the  British  atomic  establishment   located  at  Harwell,  England, 
In  1955  ii  '^oas  reported   that  Pontecorvo,    then   in  Moscow,    US£R, 
where  he  was  working  on  Soviet  atomic  projects,    claimed   that 
he  had  left   the    "capitalist  world"  because   of  preparations 
being  made  for  the  use   of  atomic   energy  for  military  purposes. 

On  May  25»    195-^>    ^w  British  diplomats,    Guy  Francis 
DeMoncy  Burgess  and  Donald  Duart  Maclean,   also  disappeared, 
Maclean  had  been  assigned  as  a  member  at   the  British  Embassy, 
Washington,  D,    C,   from  May,    1944,    until  September,    1948, 

62   - 

Burgess  served   in  a  similar  capacity  in  the  Ifi^ited  States 
from  August,    1950,    until   his   recall    in  May,    1951'      I'n 
February,    195^ t    they  handed  a  prepared  statement   to  members 
of  the  press    in  Moscow,    OSSR,    in  which  both  admitted  having 
been  communists  at  college  and  stated   that  Burgess  arranged 
for  their  escape   inasmuch  as  Maclean  was  under  surveillance, 
Vladimir  M,   Petrov,   Soviet    intelligence  officer  who  defected 
in  Australia   in  195^t    stated  that  he  had   learned  from  a 
colleague   that   the  flight   of  Burgess  and  Maclean,    both 
long-term  Soviet  agents,    had  been  planned  from  Moscow, 

-  63  - 



Free  Library  of  Philadelphia 

351.74  Un3e 

United  States. 

Exposbe  of  Soviet  espionage,  M 

3  2222  03113  5645 

^1~  32269 


iln  \  111  I  I  'J-tilJi.*  »